Scholars' Mine
Doctoral Dissertations

Student Theses and Dissertations

Fall 2013

Risk analysis: comparative study of various techniques
Hanan Mohammad Altabbakh

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarsmine.mst.edu/doctoral_dissertations
Part of the Operations Research, Systems Engineering and Industrial Engineering Commons

Department: Engineering Management and Systems Engineering
Recommended Citation
Altabbakh, Hanan Mohammad, "Risk analysis: comparative study of various techniques" (2013). Doctoral
Dissertations. 2252.
https://scholarsmine.mst.edu/doctoral_dissertations/2252

This thesis is brought to you by Scholars' Mine, a service of the Missouri S&T Library and Learning Resources. This
work is protected by U. S. Copyright Law. Unauthorized use including reproduction for redistribution requires the
permission of the copyright holder. For more information, please contact scholarsmine@mst.edu.

RISK ANALYSIS: COMPARATIVE STUDY OF VARIOUS TECHNIQUES

by
HANAN MOHAMMAD ALTABBAKH
A DISSERTATION
Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School of the
MISSOURI UNIVERSITY OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
in
ENGINEERING MANAGEMENT
2013
Approved by
Susan Murray, Advisor
Katie Grantham
Steven Corns
Hong Sheng
Nick Lockwood

© 2013
Hanan Mohammad Altabbakh
All Rights Reserved

iii

PUBLICATION DISSERTATION OPTION

This dissertation has been prepared in the format of the publication option. Four
articles are presented.
1. Pages 4 to 23 “Applying the Swiss Cheese Model of Accident Causation.” Is in
the style required by the Annual International Conference of the American
Society for Engineering Management. The citation is: Altabbakh,	
   Hanan,	
   and	
  
Susan	
  L.	
  Murray,	
  “Applying	
  The	
  Swiss	
  Cheese	
  Model	
  of	
  Accident	
  Causation”,	
  
Annual	
   International	
   Conference	
   of	
   the	
   American	
   Society	
   for	
   Engineering	
  
Management,	
  Curran	
  Associates,	
  Inc.	
  (October	
  2011),	
  pp.	
  301-‐307.
2. Pages 24 to 62 “Variations in Risk Management Models: A Comparative Study of
the Space Shuttle Challenger Disaster.” Is in the style required by Engineering
Management Journal. The citation is: Hanan	
   Altabbakh,	
   Susan	
   Murray,	
   Katie	
  
Grantham,	
  and	
  Siddharth	
  Damle,	
  “Variations	
  in	
  Risk	
  Management	
  Models:	
  A	
  
Comparative	
   Study	
   of	
   the	
   Space	
   Shuttle	
   Challenger	
   Disaster.”	
   Engineering	
  
Management	
  Journal,	
  25:2	
  (June	
  2013),	
  pp.	
  13-‐24.
3. Pages 63 to 99 “STAMP - Holistic System Safety Approach or Just Another Risk
Model?”

Is in the style required by Journal of Loss Prevention in Process

Industries. It has been submitted and is under review.
4. Pages	
   100	
   to	
   110	
   “Toward	
   Quantifying	
   the	
   Safety	
   Cognition	
   in	
   the	
  
Undergraduate	
   Engineering	
   Student.”	
   Is	
   in	
   the	
   style	
   required	
   by	
   American	
  
Society	
  of	
  Mechanical	
  Engineers.	
  	
  

iv

ABSTRACT

Researchers in the safety field are facing more challenges everyday with the
expanding modern socio-technical systems. Safety analysis such as hazard analysis,
accident causation analysis, and risk assessment are being revisited to overcome the
shortcoming of the conventional safety analysis. With increasingly complex human
system interaction in today’s modern systems, new safety challenges are being faced that
needed to be assessed and addressed. Managers and engineers face the challenge to
choose from the vast amount of techniques available and utilize the correct one. Indeed,
new or improved risk assessment tools that can address these complexities are needed.
One of the most important steps in assessing risk is first to categorize it. There
are risks associated with product component failure, human error, operational failure,
environmental disasters, etc. So far, however, there has been little discussion about how
do managers choose between the available risk assessments tools, which this considered
the first step in risk analysis. In this research, risk assessment tools have been
investigated, analyzed, categorized, and then applied to case studies in different
industries. A pathway for researchers has been paved to overcome the difficulties in
choosing risk assessment tools.
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1. INTRODUCTION

It is amazing how our world is advancing everyday with more technologies and
inventions. The advancement in technologies merged with different industries.

For

example, the medical field utilizes nano technology to perform complex procedures. The
communication had its share of success where the Internet bridged the gap as information
is transferred in fractions of a second from one location to another. Software became
more complex in solving mathematical models, and it is used in sophisticated
manufacturing processes as well. In fact, these technologies became more interrelated to
introduce new products and services to mankind. However, such progress introduced new
types of challenges due to the complexity of both organizations and processes. As a
result, new types of risks need to be identified. Risk is “a characteristic of a situation or
action wherein two or more outcomes are possible, the particular outcome that will occur
is unknown, and at least one of the possibilities is undesired” (Covello and Merkhofer,
1993). The technologies with its advancement have become so complex that these new
risks need new risk assessment tools.
“Risk assessment is the process of identification, evaluation, acceptance, aversion,
and management of risk” (Eccleston, 2011). Researchers faced the challenge to develop
new risk assessment techniques to overcome the shortage in the conventional ones
available. Managers and engineers face the challenge to choose from the vast amount of
techniques available and utilize the correct one. One of the most important steps in
assessing risk is first to categorize it. There are risks associated with product component
failure, human error, operational failure, environmental disasters, etc. So far, however,
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there has been little discussion about how do managers choose between the available risk
assessments tools, which this considered the first step in risk analysis. One of the most
significant questions that will arise when assessing risk is, which tool should be used in
this scenario? In this research, risk assessment tools have been investigated, analyzed,
categorized and then applied to case studies in the aviation and oil and gas industry. A
pathway for researchers has been paved to overcome the difficulties in choosing risk
assessment tools.
The overall structure of the dissertation takes the form of six sections, including
this introductory section. Section two begins by a conference paper that was presented
and published at the Annual International Conference of the American Society for
Engineering Management 2011, “Applying the Swiss Cheese Model of Accident
Causation.” The paper introduces the Swiss Cheese Model of accident causation, which
was developed by James Reason, explores it, and applies it to two case studied to test its
applicability and validity. The third section is a journal article that was published in the
Engineering Management Journal Special Issue –Risk Analysis June 2013, “Variations in
Risk Management Models: A Comparative Study of the Space Shuttle Challenger
Disaster.” The article is addresses more risk assessment tools such as Failure Mode and
Effects Analysis (FMEA), Fault Tree Analysis (FTA), Risk in Early Design (RED),
Layer of Protection analysis (LOPA), and Swiss Cheese Model of Accident Causation.
It identifies the advantages, limitations and applicability of each tool and utilizes
the Space Shuttle Challenger as a case study. Section four presents a journal article that
was submitted and is under review in the Journal of Loss Prevention in Process
Industries, “STAMP - Holistic System Safety Approach or Just Another Risk Model?”
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The article introduces a relatively new risk assessment model that has not been evaluated
in the literature. Moreover, the article identifies the advantages and disadvantages of the
model and applies it to a case study in the oil and gas industry to validate its applicability.
Section five is an article that won first place in the 2012 Student Safety
Innovation Challenge for the American Society of Mechanical Engineer’s Safety
Engineering and Risk Analysis Division (SERAD), “Toward	
   Quantifying	
   the	
   Safety	
  
Cognition	
  in	
  the	
  Undergraduate	
  Engineering	
  Student.”	
  	
  This	
  article	
  analyzes	
  a	
  survey	
  
that	
  conducted	
  to	
  measure	
  the	
  Safety	
  knowledge	
  and	
  attitude	
  of	
  young	
  engineering	
  
students	
  in	
  an	
  effort	
  to	
  improve	
  safety	
  and	
  prevent	
  accidents	
  in	
  labs	
  and	
  workshops.	
  	
  
Finally,	
  in	
  section	
  six,	
   the	
  conclusion	
  provides	
  a	
  brief	
  summary	
  and	
  critique	
  of	
  the	
  
findings.	
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PAPER

I. APPLYING THE SWISS CHEESE MODEL OF ACCIDENT
CAUSATION

Hanan Altabbakh
Susan Murray, Ph.D.
Missouri S&T

Abstract
This paper shows how utilizing the Swiss Cheese Model of accident causation can
aid engineering managers in understanding how errors might occur and how they can be
prevented. Human error is an issue of concern for every system. Engineering managers
need a structured approach to identify system gaps that fail to address potential human
errors.

The model considers different levels of human error including unsafe acts,

preconditions for unsafe acts, unsafe supervision, and organizational influences.
Examples of past incidents including the Space Shuttle Challenger and the Exxon
Valdez oil spill that resulted in catastrophic outcomes will be analyzed using the Swiss
Cheese Model to identify potential hazards, safeguards, and shortcomings that resulted in
loss of human lives, financial ruin, environmental damages and other impacts.
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Introduction
The Swiss Cheese Model has been used for different types of accidents; it has
most commonly been adopted in health care and aviation safety. In this paper we will
compare how each of these industries define their perspectives of the Swiss Cheese
Model. Furthermore, we will explore a new model for industrial application from an
engineering management perspective. First we will define the model and proceed with
examples from aviation and health care. Then we will introduce the new sequenced
defensive layers for our examples the Space Shuttle Challenger and the Exxon Valdez oil
spill incidents. The Space Shuttle Challenger disaster demonstrated a valuable example of
human error and incorrect decision-making at an organizational level. The Exxon Valdez
oil spill incident shows different prospective of error causation, where all levels of the
organization contributed to the incident, including the crewmembers in direct contact
with the system.

Background
The Swiss Cheese Model was developed by James Reason to address accidents in
complex systems where many components interact with each other. Reason (2008),
presented multiple human error accident examples in aviation systems, which include
component aircrafts, runways, control towers, communication tools and equipment,
luggage transport and handling systems. These components interact with each other to
form a complex system, which function as a whole. Moreover, each component works
independently by rules and policies set as a single system and interacts with other
components to function as part of a whole system following different additive rules and
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policies. Considering the variety of components, policies, rules and environments, these
systems are complex, which makes it harder for analysts to assess risk mitigation, human
potential error, and accident prevention. Many of the current risk assessment tools do not
go far enough. Some of them only identify technical aspects of the adverse event,
pointing the finger toward the operator’s actions without tracing back to the origin of the
accident and its circumstances.
The Swiss Cheese Model was proposed to overcome such dilemma by introducing
a model that tracks accident causation in different levels of the organization without
blaming individuals.

“We cannot change the human condition, we can change the

conditions under which humans work” (Reason, 2000).
James Reason presented his model as stacked slices of Swiss cheese, where the
slices represent the defenses and safeguards of the system and the holes represent active
failures (i.e. unsafe acts) and latent conditions. Unsafe acts occur when a human is in
direct contact with the system such as during the Chernobyl accident where the operator
wrongly violated the plant procedures and switched off successive safety system. On the
other hand, latent condition can occur at any level of the organization or any system and it
is harder to detect such as lack of training, poor design, and inadequate supervision,
unnoticed defects in manufacturing (Reason, 1997). Latent conditions considered the
source of ignition of any accident or error (Reason, 2000).
The holes in the model are not static. They move from one position to another,
may open or close, and change in size continuously depending on the situation and the
climate of the system. According to Sidney Dekker (2002), it is the investigator’s job to
find out the position, type, source, and size of each hole and identify the cause of these
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changes. Finally, the investigator must determine how the holes line up to produce
accidents since all holes must align through all the defensive layers for the trajectory to
pass through and cause the adverse event as shown in Exhibit 1.
Exhibit 1. The Swiss Cheese Model

In contrary to the latest version where the layers are not specified, Exhibit 2
shows the previous version of the model, where it consisted of five layers as follows:
•

Fallible decisions

•

Line management deficiencies

•

Psychological precursors of unsafe acts

•

Unsafe acts

•

Inadequate defenses
The current version is not limited to certain numbers of defensive layers nor have

they been labeled or specified. Thus, a variety of layers of defenses and safeguards
can be adapted to this model from different organizational environments depending
on the amount of risk involved.
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Exhibit 2. First Version of The Swiss Cheese Model

The Swiss Cheese Model in Aviation
Wiegmann and Shappell (2003) conducted a study to identify the holes and
safeguards of the aviation system. They were able to precisely target each defensive
layer and classify its holes (i.e. unsafe acts and latent conditions). They categorize the
layers into four levels of human failure where each layer influenced the succeeding one
as shown in Exhibit 3.
Exhibit 3. The Swiss Cheese Model in Aviation
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Each of the following bullets represents a defensive layer in the model:
•

Unsafe acts
o Errors
!

Decision

!

Skill-based

!

Perceptual

o Violations

•

!

Routine

!

Exceptional

Preconditions for unsafe acts
o Substandard conditions for operators
!

Adverse mental states

!

Adverse physiological states

!

Physical/mental limitations

o Substandard practices of operators

•

!

Crew resource mismanagement

!

Personal readiness

Unsafe supervision
o Inadequate supervision
o Planned inappropriate operations
o Failed to correct problem
o Supervisory violations

•

Organizational influences
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o Recourse management
o Organizational climate
o Organizational process
Under each bullet, they identified whether the corresponding potential error was
an active or a latent failure.
The application of the Swiss Cheese Model for aviation was successful to an
extent. Several modifications were made to the original model to make it specific to
aviation. Over 300 naval aviation accidents were assessed to identify the holes and
defensive layers that are specific to the aviation industry. The Swiss Cheese Model for
Aviation cannot be applied successfully to other industries because of its specificity.
According to (Reason, et al., 2006, 9) “The model was intended to be a generic
tool that could be used in any well defended domain—it is for the local investigators to
supply the local details”.

The Swiss Cheese Model in Medicine Management and Health Care
Avery et al. (2002) adapted the Swiss Cheese Model for management of
medicine. Errors in the process of medicine management are considered an important
cause of induced harm in health care. For example, a patient suffered an adverse event
after using a previously prescribed medicine without considering its current
contraindications with his/her developing health situation. The slices of cheese, (i.e. the
defensive layers), were introduced and both active failures and latent conditions were
classified. The following model shown in Exhibit 4 was then generalized to be used in
primary care risk management.
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Exhibit 4. The Swiss Cheese Model of Error in Medicine Management

Other representations of the model were adapted for use in health care institutions
and hospitals. Carthey et al. (2001) demonstrated the use of this model for determining
cardiac surgery accident causation as shown in Exhibit 5.
They classified the defensive layers into five categories:
•

Health care organization

•

Hospital management

•

Cardiac surgery department

•

Preoperative decision making

•

Intraoperative problems
In their paper, they illustrated some examples of the active failures and latent

conditions in relation to each defensive layer and safeguard.
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Exhibit 5. Generic Organizational Accident Model Applied to Health Care
System (Carthey et al., 2001)

In the previous applications, the investigators discussed brief examples of the
latent conditions and active failures without identifying the location of holes and their
sizes. In contrast to the aviation model, which can be generalized to the whole aviation
industry, the previous health care models were limited to each specific branch of the
health care industry; models for medicine management would not apply to cardiac
surgery and vice versa.

The Swiss Cheese Model in Engineering Management Perspective
For the rest of this paper, we will illustrate how to classify and adapt the Swiss
Cheese Model into engineering management applications.
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The Space Shuttle Challenger Incident
In 1986 the Space Shuttle Challenger, exploded 74 seconds after launch killing
seven astronauts including the teacher in space. Technically, the main cause of the
disaster was the O-ring designs. According to the presidential commission report (1986),
the cause of the accident was the failure, due to improper design, of the pressure seal in
the aft field joint of the right solid rocket booster. Top management, line managers,
engineers, companies, and the organizational climate contributed to the disaster. We will
examine the Challenger and classify the errors made according Reason’s Swiss Cheese
Model (1990).

Unsafe Acts
Errors in the launch of the Space Shuttle Challenger were unintentional. Blame
cannot be attributed to a pilot, crewmember, operator, or controller. The incident was
due to poor decision-making at the upper management level, which constitutes an unsafe
act under the decision error type (Orasanu, 1993). The commander and pilot flying the
shuttle are considered the direct operators, but in the Challenger disaster it was not their
choice whether or not to launch; it was the decision maker’s. Therefore, the unsafe act
defensive layer might not be applicable in the case of the Challenger, thus this layer
would be removed from the model. However, according to the Swiss Cheese Model, it
takes both active failure and latent condition to cause an accident, so removing an
essential layer might invalidate the model.
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Psychological Precursors of Unsafe Acts
The weather on the day of the launch was threatening, thus introducing latent
failure. For a successful reseal of the O-ring, the environmental temperature should be ≥
53°F. According to Thiokol, low temperature would jeopardize the capability of the
secondary sealing of the Solid Rocket Motor (Kerzner, 2009). Communicating that issue
was complicated by the fact that engineers use technical jargon that is not always
understood by upper management. Moreover, the ice on the launch pad introduced
additional risk factors to the launch operation. The ice also covered the handrails and
walkways surrounding the shuttle, which presented hindrances to emergency access. In
addition, availability of spare parts, physical dimension, material characteristics, and
effects of reusability were other factors that may have contributed to the disaster.

Line Management Deficiencies
Line management did not adequately enforce a safety program (Kerzner, 2009).
As a result, all risks were treated as anomaly and that became the norm in the NASA
culture. An escape system during launch was not designed due to overconfidence in the
reliability of the space shuttle and that having a plan would be cost effective. A latent
failure introduced an unsafe act which violated the most important factor; the safety of
the crew. Pressure to launch on the designated schedule due to competition, politics,
media, and congress issues made it hard for line managers to communicate the engineers
concerns and reports to top decision makers and administrators. Problems that were
discussed internally at Thiokol and NASA were not adequately communicated between
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the two organizations due to lack of problem reporting procedures.

The lack of

communication introduced a latent failure.

Fallible Decisions
Budget was a major constraint at NASA at that time.

Consequently, top

management at NASA approved the design of the solid rocket motor in its entirety,
including the O-ring joint, even when this meant changing the research direction at a
great cost. Risk was accepted at all levels since calculated safety projections were
favorable. A NASA position for permanent administrator was empty for four months
prior to the accident, and turnover rate of upper management was considerably high,
which resulted in a breakdown in communication from the top down. Moreover, lack
of communication between NASA’s top decision makers and Thiokol’s technical
engineers introduced a gap where problem reporting remained in house. Concerns never
reached top officials in NASA for fear of job loss. Moreover, bad news was generally
downplayed to protect the interests of higher officials. In general, there was no accepted
standard for problem reporting that transected all levels of either NASA or Thiokol.
There was no clear recommendation from Thiokol not to launch under the cold
weather condition (Kerzner, 2009). According to (The Presidential Commission on the
Space Shuttle Challenger Accident Report 1986, 82) regarding the launch decision,
“Those who made that decision were unaware of the recent history of problems
concerning the O-rings and the joint and were unaware of the initial written
recommendation of the contractor advising against the launch at temperatures below 53
degrees Fahrenheit and the continuing opposition of the engineers at Thiokol after the
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management reversed its position. They did not have a clear understanding of Rockwell's
concern that it was not safe to launch because of ice on the pad. If the decision makers
had known all of the facts, it is highly unlikely that they would have decided to launch
51-L on January 28, 1986”. The general lack of communication both between NASA and
Thiokol, and internally within each organization, functions as a latent condition.

Summary of The Space Shuttle Challenger Incident
The Space Shuttle Challenger’s holes were not identified in sufficient time for
safeguards to be implemented to prevent such catastrophic loss. Moreover, there was no
active failure involved in the front end layer of defense; all decisions were made from the
top management level of the organization. With the miscommunication that occurred
between NASA and Thiokol, the administrators at NASA were not aware of the potential
risk that was involved with the launch decision. As a result, the unsafe acts layer of
defense was discarded, resulting in a critical flaw in the Swiss Cheese Model—without
the provisions to counteract or override unsafe acts, the model is inadequate for accident
prevention. Further investigation is needed to determine whether another model may be
more successful in addressing complex systems such as the NASA space shuttle launch,
in terms of identifying risk factors and predicting potential accidents.

The Exxon Valdez Oil Spill Incident
The Exxon Valdez oil spill disaster will demonstrate how active failures and
latent conditions merge to cause a catastrophic adverse event that could have been
avoided. The incident occurred on Mach 24, 1989, when the vessel ran aground on Bligh
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Reef its way to transport crude oil from Alaska to California. Approximately 10 million
gallons of crude oil were spilled into the Prince William Sound, Alaska, after eight cargo
tanks were ruptured. The incident caused a huge environmental issue, and the cost of
cleaning the water exceeded $2 billion in addition to the costs of vessel damage and the
various lawsuits from the environmental agencies, fishermen and other affected parties
were filed (Harrald, et al., 1990). Human error contributed greatly to the accident. Errors
were made from all levels of the organization. We will next utilize the Swiss Cheese
Model of Accident Causation to analyze this incident and its contributed factors.

Unsafe Acts
The holes in this layer of the model were essential to cause the accident along
with the latent condition that existed:
•

The crew did not get enough time to rest before departing the port. Which is
considered a violation of the amount of sleep required before being able to go on
a cargo watch task. As a result, the crewmembers suffered fatigue due to the
impaired task performance (National Transportation Safety Board, 1990).

•

The crew also violated the procedures of consuming alcohol before and while on
mission on the vessel. Evident showed that the master, the captain and the other
mates on the vessel were intoxicated.

•

The captain violated the navigation rules by travelling outside the normal
shipping lanes in an attempt to avoid ice. Violating the procedures of slowing
down to a minimum speed in the original shipping lane and passing the ice.
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•

The captain also violated procedures by not being accurate and precise in
reporting position and speed of the vessel on time.

•

Incorrect procedure was taken by crewmember to maneuver the vessel to avoid
ice.

•

The crew violated the Exxon Shipping Company Navigation and Bridge
Organization Manual by reducing the number of officers required on the bridge.
For the specific situation on the vessel, two navigating officers were required to
attend on the bridge. Unfortunately only one was there since the captain was
absent.

•

The captain engaged the vessel on autopilot violating the regulation set by the
USCG. Also violating the standing orders of the Exxon Shipping Company that
steering should always be manual if navigating near the shore or shallow banks
(Alaska Spill Oil Commission, 1990).

Psychological Precursors of Unsafe Acts
Some of the major latent conditions that factored in the accident:
•

The presence of the icebergs

•

Crewmembers fatigue condition due to lack of sleep

•

The alcohol-impaired captain on board

•

Inadequate training on vessel maneuvering

•

Reduced number of manpower in the port, the bridge and on vessel

•

Lack of procedures with regards to hours-of-service (National Transportation
Safety Board, 1990)
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The previous latent conditions represent the weaknesses in the safeguards of the
system of the Exxon Valdez. If these were detected in proper time, the accident would
not have happened.

Line Management Deficiencies
Inadequate supervision at the port and on board vessel was the main cause of
generating the holes on this defensive layer:
•

The captain did not request to stay longer at the port for the crew to get enough
rest.

•

Failing to correct the shortage of officers and crewmembers required in port and
on vessel that caused impaired task performance

•

Lack of problem reporting communication between the vessel and the port

•

Inadequate instructions were communicated to crewmembers with regards to
procedures in maneuvering the vessel.

•

Lack of feedback when problems were reported to the captain

•

Incorrect procedures with regards to navigating the vessel through ice

•

The master did not provide an adequate watch over the vessel due to alcoholimpairment.

Fallible Decisions
The weakness of this defensive layer demonstrated how inadequate regulations
and supervisions resulted in catastrophic accident:
•

Lack of contingency plans
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•

Limitation of the technology available and required equipment in case of such
accident (Harrald et al., 1990)

•

Lack of resources; i.e. crewmembers

•

Lack of procedure regarding crew members safety and drug tests

•

Lack of training for crewmembers

•

Poor utilization of safety plans and communication equipment - There is evidence
that the radar on the port was not working effectively at the time the vessel was
navigating (Leveson, 2005).	
  

•

Assigning a master before proofing his alcohol problem was under control.	
  

Summary of The Exxon Valdez Oil Spill Incident
The Exxon Valdez oil spill incident’s demonstrated how all levels of the
organization can contribute to the cause of a catastrophic disaster. Blame cannot be
pointed to the crewmembers alone in this incident due to the lack of regulations and the
norm of organizational behavior, where violating the procedures were practiced to
overcome obstacles and meet schedules. The holes in the Exxon Valdez oil spill were
identified in each layer. The holes lined up in the stacked weak defensive layer, and the
trajectory of accident breach causing the unfortunate disaster, which could have been
avoided if these unsafe acts and their related latent conditions were identified in the
proper time.
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Conclusion
Human errors have caused numerous catastrophic disasters over the past decades.
Tracking the causes of these error will reveals contributing factors to these errors. The
Swiss Cheese Model of accident causation suggested that in order for an accident to
occur all the safeguards in the organization have to be breached with a trajectory that
passes through all the holes, which includes unsafe acts and latent conditions. Identifying
and characterizing these holes and preparing the corresponding defensive safeguards
early in the system will make it almost impossible for a trajectory to pass through every
layer. Unfortunately, Reason did not specify how to apply the Swiss Cheese Model. He
suggested the theory and handed it over to the investigators to identify all the holes and
defensive layers. However, it is unclear how to allocate the holes and measure their sizes,
or how to relate each of the active failures to the corresponding latent condition. The
Swiss Cheese Model was not successfully utilized in the Space Shuttle Challenger
incident due to the lack of one vital defensive layer; the unsafe act. However, the model
was valid for the Exxon Valdez oil spill incident. Both accidents were caused mainly by
human error and were operating as a complex system. After examining the previous
engineering management applications, it turned out that not all complex accidents could
be investigated using the Swiss Cheese Model. Further instructions and modifications
are needed by investigators to be able to apply the model.

22
References
Alaska Oil Spill Commission. Spill: the Wreck of the Exxon Valdez, Implications for Safe
Transportation of Oil: Final Report. Junea: the Commission, (1990).
Avery AJ, A. Sheikh, B. Hurwitz, L. Smeaton, Y-F Chen, RL Howard, J. Cantrill, and S.
Royal, Safer medicines management in primary care. Br J Gen Pract (2002),
52(Suppl):S17–22.
Carthey J, MR de Leval, JT Reason, The human factor in cardiac surgery: errors and
near misses in a high technology medical domain. Ann Thorac Surg (2001), 72:300 –5.
Harrald, J. R., H. S. Marcus, and W. A. Wallace, The EXXON Valdez: An assessment of
crisis prevention and management systems. Interfaces, (October, 1990), Vol. 20(5),
pp.14–20.
Kerzner, Harold. Project Management: Case Studies, (2009), Wiley & Sons. New Jersey,
pp. 425-461.
Nancy G. Leveson "Software System Safety". Ocw.mit.edu, (July 2005), pp. 18–20.
Retrieved 2010-07-30.
Orasanu, J.M., Decision-making in the cockpit. In E.L. Wiener, B.G. Kanki, and R.L.
Helmreich (Eds.), Cockpit resource management, (1993), San Diego, CA: Academic
Press. pp. 137-72.
Reason J. Human error, (1990), New York: Cambridge University Press.
Reason J. Human error: models and management, BMJ, (2000), 320:768–70.
Reason, J., E. Hollnagel, and J. Paries. Revisiting the Swiss cheese model of accidents,
(2006) Eurocontrol, EEC Note no. 13/06.
Reason J. T., The Human Contribution: Unsafe Acts, Accidents and Heroic Recoveries.
(2008), Ashgate Publishing.
Sidney Dekker. The Field Guide to Human Error Investigations, (2002), pp. 119-120.
The National Transportation Safety Board, Safety recommendation, Exxon Valdez report,
(September 18, 1990), in reply to M-90-26 through -3.
U.S. Presidential Commission, Report on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident, (1986),
http://science.ksc.nasa.gov/shuttle/missions/51-l/docs/rogers-commission/table-ofcontents.html.

23
Wiegmann, Douglas A., and Scott A. Shappell, A human error approach to aviation
accident analysis, The human factors analysis and classification system, (2003),
Burlington, VT: Ashgate.

24

II. VARIATIONS IN RISK MANAGEMENT MODELS:
A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THE SPACE SHUTTLE
CHALLENGER DISASTER	
  

Hanan Altabbakh, Susan Murray, Katie Grantham, Siddharth Damle	
  
Missouri University of Science and Technology
Abstract
Managers seeking to assess risk within complex systems face enormous
challenges. They must identify a seemingly endless number of risks and develop
contingency plans accordingly. This study explores the strengths and limitations of two
categories of risk assessment tools: product assessment techniques including Failure
Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA) and Risk in Early Design (RED) and process
assessment techniques, such as Layer of Protection Analysis (LOPA) and the Swiss
Cheese Model (SCM). A NASA case study is used to evaluate these risk assessment
models. The case study considers the January 1986 explosion of the Space Shuttle
Challenger, 73 seconds after liftoff. This incident resulted in the loss of seven crew
members and consequently grave criticisms of NASA’s risk management practices. The
paper concludes with comparison and recommendations for engineering managers on
selecting risk assessment tools for complex systems.
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Introduction to Risk Assessment
Risk exists in our everyday activities from getting out of bed in the morning to the
most complicated task in any complex system. Managers need to consider a wide range
of risks, including risks related to products’ component failure, human error, and
operational failure. There are a variety of assessment tools for each of these risk types.
The Human Systems Integration Handbook (Booher, 2003) lists 101 techniques
available for evaluating safety in complex systems. Even with this wealth of tools, or
perhaps because of them, mitigating risks remains a daunting task. Various authors have
generated definitions of risk. According to Covello and Merkhofer, risk is defined as “a
characteristic of a situation or action wherein two or more outcomes are possible, the
particular outcome that will occur is unknown, and at least one of the possibilities is
undesired” (Covello & Merkhofer, 1993). NASA defines risk as the chance (qualitative)
of loss of personnel capability, loss of system, or damage to or loss of equipment or
property (National Research Council, 1988). Another definition of risk was founded by
the Occupational Health and Safety Assessment Series (OHSAS), which states “Risk is a
combination of the likelihood of an occurrence of a hazardous event or exposure(s) and
the severity of injury or ill health that can be caused by the event or exposure(s)”
(OHSAS, 2007).
Taxonomies of risk have been established in the literature where some risks were
categorized according to their source, for example, political, environmental, and
economic risk sources. Risks can also be categorized according to industry or service
segment or according to their order of significance from the user’s perspective. These
classifications might limit engineers and managers to existing taxonomies only, avoiding
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investigation for further risk classification, or even omitting unidentified ones. In that
case, engineers and managers must have risk assessment tools as part of their risk
management programs available in hand along with the existing taxonomies to evaluate a
design for risks (Letens, Van Nuffel, Heene, & Leysen, 2008).
“Risk assessment is the process of identification, evaluation, acceptance,
aversion, and management of risk” (Eccleston, 2011). A study conducted by interviewing
51 project managers proved that experience alone does not contribute to risk
identification among engineers and managers as much as the level of education,
information search style, and training (Maytorena, Winch, Freeman, & Kiely, 2007).
Murray developed a generic risk matrix that can be adapted by project
management to quickly identify potential risk, probability, and impact (Murray,
Grantham, & Damle, 2011). After identifying risks and quantifying their magnitude, the
next step in risk assessment is to evaluate the associated decisions to be made and their
impact. There are various risk assessment tools for different risk environments such as
nuclear reactors, chemical plants, health industry, construction, automotive industry,
project management, financial industry, and others. In general, they all address three
issues: the adverse event, its likelihood, and its consequences. Reducing the probability
of failure and its consequences has been the major goal of reliability and safety analysis.
Failures can cause loss of life, significant financial expenses, and environmental
harm (Henley & Kumamoto, 1981). Determining the appropriate assessment tool(s) is the
first step in risk analysis. These can include simple, qualitative, quantitative, and hybrid
assessment approaches (National Research Council, 2007). The purpose of this paper is
to investigate the advantages and shortcomings of various product and process-based risk
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assessment tools to assist engineers, managers, and decision makers in selecting the
proper tools for the specific situation. The Space Shuttle Challenger Disaster is used to
demonstrate the differences among the techniques.

Space Shuttle Challenger Disaster	
  
On January 28, 1986 the Space Shuttle Challenger took off for the last time. Its
flight lasted just over a minute when the Space Shuttle exploded resulting in the loss of
all its seven crew members. The Challenger was the most anticipated launch for NASA
and was supposed to be a milestone for more than one reason. The technical cause for the
accident was determined to be the erosion of the o-ring on one of the solid rocket
boosters, which allowed the passage of hot gases. This caused the release of hydrogen
into the external tank, which deflagrated and caused the shuttle to blow up.
Unfortunately, this technical glitch was just one of the factors attributed to the
failure of this high profile space mission.
Over the next three months, a presidential commission led by former Secretary of
State William P. Rogers and a NASA team investigated the accident (Damle & Murray,
2012). The commission concluded that there was a serious flaw in the decision making
process leading up to the launch. A well structured and managed system emphasizing
safety would have flagged the rising doubts about the solid rocket booster joint seal. Had
these matters been clearly stated and emphasized in the flight readiness process in terms
reflecting the views of most of the Thiokol (a subcontractor responsible for the solid
rocket boosters (SRBs)) engineers and at least some of the Marshall Space Center
engineers, it seems likely that the launch of 51-L might not have occurred when it did.
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Apparently, Thiokol was pressured into giving a go ahead for the launch by
NASA.
Reasons for the disaster (Damle & Murray, 2012):
1.

Faulty o-ring – The o-ring sealing in the solid rocket boosters eroded and let hot
gases pass through causing an explosion.

2.

Application beyond operational specifications – The o-rings had been tested at
530F before, but were never exposed to launch day temperatures of 260F.

3.

Communication – Thiokol and NASA were geographically away from one
another and travel for meetings was not feasible. This led to communication issues
between the two organizations.

4.

Management pressure – The engineers at Thiokol knew about the o-ring’s poor
performance at low temperatures, but management forced them to let go of technical
issues citing “broader picture.”

5.

Risk management – Proper risk management methods were not in place at
NASA. The criticality of the o-ring problem had been downgraded without sufficient
evidence. Also, it had become a norm to issue waivers against problems to meet the
schedule requirements of flights.

6.

Global competition – The European Space Agency had started competing for
the commercial satellite business. Also, NASA had to beat the Russians at deploying a
probe into Haley Comet from the same launch station, which meant the Challenger had
to be launched as per schedule.
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7.

Budget pressure – NASA was tight on budget and hence had to curb many of its
research and development activities. Also, it had to launch a large number of flights
that year to justify expenditure on the Space Shuttle program.

8.

Political pressure – President Reagan was supposed to announce the inclusion
of a school teacher on the Challenger mission at his State of Union Speech. This put
additional pressure on NASA to launch the spacecraft as scheduled. This also attracted
excessive media attention on this mission and NASA felt its reputation was at stake.
Prior to the Challenger accident in 1986, NASA emphasized quantitative risk

analysis such as Fault Tree Analysis. The low probability of success during the Apollo
moon missions intimidated NASA from persuading further quantitative risk or reliability
analysis (Stamatelatos, Vesely, Dugan, Fragola, Minarick, & Railsback, 2002). More
recently NASA moved from a preference for qualitative methods such as FMEA in
assessing mission risks to an understanding of the importance of the probabilistic risk
assessment such as FTA (Stamatelatos, et al., 2002). Process-based risk assessment
techniques were not common prior to the Challenger Disaster. It was not until the early
1990s that the first process safety risk assessment techniques were introduced (Center for
Chemical Process Safety, 2001). Cost was a factor in NASA's preference for qualitative
over quantitative risk assessment. Gathering data for every single component of the
shuttle to generate statistical models that are the backbone of probabilistic assessment
tools was time consuming and expensive (Kerzner, 2009).
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Types of Risk Assessment Tools
This paper considers risk assessment tools in two broad categories: product-based
tools and process-based tools. Product-based tools concentrate on failures at the
component level, including product design shortcomings and failures. This paper
introduces FMEA, FTA, and Risk in Early Design (RED) in this category. These tools, in
spite of being comprehensive, fail to address systemic issues, mainly relating to human
error, decision making errors, culture issues, external pressures on decision making
process, and inadequate user training. Many of these issues were encountered in the
Challenger accident. This paper also considers process-based risk assessment including
Layer of Protection Analysis (LOPA) and the Swiss Cheese Model. These methods strive
to consider the system as a whole, with due consideration to organizational issues and
human error causes. Detailed descriptions of the methods and their application to the
Challenger accident follow.

Product-Based Risk Assessment Tools
Product risk assessment tools investigate risks associated with the system from the
component level and the product design. Product-based risk assessment tools are
categorized into qualitative and quantitative tools, where the probabilities of failure
occurrence are quantified in the latter one. Both of these types of risk assessment tools
can be used throughout the product life cycle, even simultaneously, to identify potential
risks. Product-based risk assessment tools do not consider the human factors due to the
complexity of human minds and behaviors.
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Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA) is a very structured and reliable
bottom-up method to classify hardware and system failures. Applying FMEA can be easy
even in a complex system due to the simplicity of the method. FMEA increases design
safety by identifying hazards early in the product lifecycle when improvements can be
made cost effectively (Dhillon, 1999). In spite of the fact that FMEA is very efficient, if
it is applied to the system as a whole, it may not be as easy if the system consists of a
number of components with multiple functions (Stamatis, 2003). FMEA only considers
hazards that lead to failure. It does not address potential hazards that result from normal
operations (NASA, 2001). Other negative aspects of the detailed FMEA format include
being very time consuming and expensive, due to its detailed nature.
A significant concern for complex systems with human interaction is that FMEA
does not consider failures that could arise due to human error (Foster, et al., 1999).
NASA used FMEA on the overall Space Shuttle program, also known as the Space
Transportation Systems (STS), the Ground Support Equipment (GSE), and individual
missions to identify the Critical Item List (CIL). This list consists of failure modes sorted
according to their severity starting with the worst (National Research Council, 1988).
Exhibit 1 explains the consequence classification system at NASA where critical items
are classified according to their effect on the crew, the vehicle, and the mission (Kerzner,
2009).
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Exhibit 1: The Consequences Classification System (Kerzner, 2009)
Level

Description

Criticality 1 (C1)

Loss of life and/or vehicle if the component fails

Criticality 1R (C1R)

Redundant components exist; the failure of both could cause loss of life
and/or vehicle

Criticality 2 (C2)

Loss of mission if the component fails

Criticality 2R (C2R)

Redundant components exist; the failure of both could cause loss of mission

Criticality 3 (C3)

All others

In 1982 (four years before the Challenger explosion), FMEA revealed that the
Space Shuttle’s o-ring seal had a criticality rating of 1 (Winsor, 1988). However, it was
only one of over 700 criticality 1 classified components that existed in 1985 (Kerzner,
2009). During this time period, C1 risk items were considered acceptable risks and
waivers were issued by managers.

Fault Tree Analysis
Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) is a top-down probabilistic risk assessment technique.
It is a deductive method that investigates the factors and conditions that contribute to
adverse events in a system. It utilizes logic gates and graphical diagrams to identify the
failures in the system, subsystem, and components. The FTA starts with a critical root
event and proceeds with determining all the possible potential causes, parallel and
sequential, that contribute to the top adverse event and represents it as a cause-and-effect
relationship (Ireson, Coombs, & Moss, 1995). There is no single correct way to construct
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a fault tree. Different people can come up with different fault trees for the same root
event. FTA is a probabilistic risk assessment tool that can be quantitatively evaluated
using the rules of Boolean algebra between its gates.
The strength of the FTA is that it is a visual model that clearly depicts the causeand-effect relationship between the root cause events to provide both qualitative and
quantitative results (Bertsche, 2008). Another benefit of the FTA is that it concentrates on
one particular failure at a time. The detailed, structured approach also has the advantage
of requiring the analyst to study the system in great detail in an organized manner, which
can reduce the danger of overlooking risk factor(s) (Dhillon, 1999).
This technique suffers from a few limitations. A fault tree might not be able to
capture all the error causes that are related to humans due to the complexity of human
behavior. Accounting for human error in fault trees can make the analysis too
complicated and unmanageable (Kirwan & Ainsworth, 1992). For every top-level hazard
that is identified, a thorough fault tree must be constructed which is time consuming and
lengthy. Some large fault trees may not fit into a reliability report due to their size and
complexity. Latent hazards may not be identified during the construction of a fault tree.
In January 1988, after the Space Shuttle Challenger Disaster, the Shuttle
Criticality Review and Hazard Analysis Audit Committee recommended that NASA
apply probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) methods to the risk management program
(Stamatelatos & Dezfuli, 2011). According to NASA “No comprehensive reference
currently exists for PRA applications to aerospace systems. In particular, no
comprehensive reference for applying FTA to aerospace systems currently exists.”
(Stamatelatos, Vesely, Dugan, Fragola, Minarick III, & Railsback, 2002).
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Risk in Early Design
The Risk in Early Design (RED) theory was developed in 2005 by Grantham et
al. to assist engineers in risk assessment by automatically generating lists of potential
product risks based on historical information (Grantham, Stone, & Tumer, 2009). With
given product function as inputs, RED generates the historically relevant potential failure
modes of those functions and ranks them by both their likelihood of occurrence and the
consequence, ranking from one as least severe to five as most severe of those failures.
Unlike FMEA and FTA, which require experts to identify potential failure modes,
RED utilizes a historical knowledgebase to produce the potential risks. This feature is
beneficial for novice engineers who do not have substantial experience predicting
failures; it is also beneficial for newer systems that can benefit from the performance of
older products while determining potential failures. While it is highly recommended by
the developers that experts review the RED output and assess its relevance to the system
under study, a drawback of this risk assessment method is potential risk over or under
quantification. Further, the method is only as good as the knowledgebase used to generate
the risks.

Using RED to Analyze the Space Shuttle Challenger Disaster
The first step in applying RED to identify and analyze risks is to select the
functions performed by components of the product from the provided list of
electromechanical functions from the RED software tool, http://idecms.srv.mst.edu/ide/.
For the Challenger Disaster, a “human centric, subsystem level” risk analysis of
only the solid rocket boosters (SRBs) was performed. Twenty-one functions were
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selected that represented the functionality of the SRBs. From those 21 functions, 402
risks were identified (7 high risks–upper right hand region, 130 moderate risks-middle
region, and 265 low risks-left/lower-left hand region). The risk fever chart produced by
RED is shown in Exhibit 2. The examples from the detailed report are included in Exhibit
3. Referring to Exhibit 3, of the seven high risks identified, five were suggested to fail
due to high cycle fatigue, and the remaining two were suggested to fail due to brittle
fracture. This is interesting because at the cold temperatures of the Challenger launch, the
material used for the o-rings took on more brittle characteristics. Also, the functions most
closely associated with the o-ring, “stop gas” and “stop liquid,” generated interesting
risks related to the Challenger Disaster. For example, “stop gas” was linked with the
following potential failure modes and likelihood-consequence pairs: brittle fracture
(likelihood-1, consequence-4) and thermal shock (likelihood-1, consequence-4), which
are both low risks. Similarly, “stop liquid” was linked with the following potential failure
modes and likelihood-consequence pairs: brittle fracture (likelihood-2, consequence-5)
and thermal shock (likelihood-1, consequence-5), which are both medium risks. The
classification of the risks is due to the low likelihood rating of the failures on the risk
fever chart. However, the consequence ratings represent the severity of the event, where
(consequence = 4) indicates total malfunction of the SRBs and (consequence = 5)
indicates loss of life. The risk ratings produced by RED are consistent with the
expectations that cold weather is not likely at a Space Shuttle launch; however, should it
occur, devastating consequences can be expected.
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Exhibit 2: RED Results for SRB Analysis

High risk
Low Risk
Moderate Risk

Exhibit 3: Examples from the detailed RED report
Risk Level

Function

Failure Mode

Likelihood

Consequence

High

Change Electrical Energy

High Cycle Fatigue

5

5

High

Stop Solid

High Cycle Fatigue

5

5

High

Store Solid

High Cycle Fatigue

5

5

High

Change Solid

High Cycle Fatigue

4

5

High

Stop Solid

Brittle Fracture

3

5

High

Store Solid

Brittle Fracture

3

5

High

Export Gas-Gas Mixture

High Cycle Fatigue

3

5

Med

Export Gas-Gas Mixture

Stress Corrosion

3

4

Med

Change Solid

Stress Corrosion

3

4

Med

Stop Solid

Stress Corrosion

3

4

Med

Change Electrical Energy

Stress Corrosion

3

4

Med

Store Solid

Stress Corrosion

3

4
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Product-Based Risk Assessment Tool Summary
FMEA, FTA, and RED have their limitations and merits, and they complement
each other well. FMEA is used to identify the potential failure modes of the system
components; this was done by NASA to generate the critical items list for the Space
Shuttle program. FTA, on the other hand, evaluates each of the critical items to find its
cause(s). Both can be used repeatedly throughout the system design cycle. FTA and
FMEA are standard risk assessment techniques for product components but they share the
shortcomings that they do not include human error and hostile environment (Qureshi,
2008). RED identifies and assesses risk in the early design phase, which aids managers
and decision makers in minimizing the subjectivity of the likelihoods and consequences.
Due to the simplicity of RED, managers with less experience in risk assessment can
easily adapt the tool and apply it at the conceptual phase. These risk assessment tools aid
the engineering manager in identifying a variety of hazards and associated causes at a
component level.

Process-Based Risk Assessment Tools
Process-based risk assessment tools use a system-wide approach. Instead of
identifying risks related to component and product design, these tools identify risks that
can be encountered in the entire process, including those related to humans, organization,
management, and decision making. Hence, risks involved with all entities concerned with
the product are considered. The following process-based models consider risk on a
broader system level, thus, widening the scope of risk assessment compared to the
product-based risk tools.
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Layer of Protection Analysis
Among the various existing risk management techniques being used today,
Layer of Protection Analysis (LOPA) is widely used in the process industry (Center for
Chemical Process Safety, 2001). It is a semi-quantitative analytical tool to assess the
adequacy of protection layers used to mitigate risk (Summers, 2002). LOPA is a process
hazard analysis (PHA) tool. The method utilizes the hazardous events, event severity,
initiating causes, and initiating event likelihood data developed during the hazard and
operability analysis (HAZOP). The LOPA method allows the user to determine the risk
associated with the various hazardous events by utilizing their severity and the likelihood
of the events being initiated. LOPA identifies the causes of each adverse event and
estimates the corresponding initiating event likelihood. Then, it determines the
independent protection layers (IPL) for each pair of cause-consequence scenarios and
addresses the probability of failure on demand (PFD) accordingly. To quantify the
mitigated event frequency for each IPL, LOPA multiplies each initiating event frequency
by the PFD, then compares the result to the criteria for tolerable risk (Dowell, 1999).
LOPA focuses on one cause-consequence scenario at a time. Using corporate
risk standards, the user can determine the total amount of risk reduction required and
analyze the risk reduction that can be achieved from various layers of protection
(Frederickson, 2002). IPLs, as shown in Exhibit 4, are simply safety systems that meet
the following criteria (Summers, 2002) –
1.

Specificity - The IPL should be capable of mitigating the identified initiating
event.
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2.

Independence – An IPL should be independent of any other IPL or of the
initiating event. This way, failure of one does not affect performance of any other IPL.

3.

Dependability – The IPL reduces the risk by a known amount with a known
frequency.

4.

Auditability - IPL should allow for regular validation.
Exhibit 4: Protection Layers (General Monitors, 2011)

The IPLs perform three main functions of prevention (to reduce the probability of
accident), protection (to detect the initiating cause and neutralize it) and mitigation (to
control/reduce the accident severity) (Markowski & Mannan, 2010). LOPA has
significant advantages over other fully quantitative methods. It takes less time to analyze
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scenarios that are too complex to be qualitatively evaluated, compared to a regular
quantitative risk method. It proves to be very effective in resolving disagreements in
decision making since it provides a clear, simple, and concise scenario structure to
estimate risk. The output of LOPA is vital to assign safeguards during different situations
such as operation and maintenance to assure safety of employee, assets, environment and
organization. Also, by design, LOPA deals with general decision making in risk
assessment; it is not intended to be used for detailed decision making (Center for
Chemical Process Safety, 2001). A valuable feature of LOPA is that the quantified output
of the analysis can reduce the uncertainty about residual risk levels (Gulland, 2004). The
primary disadvantage of the method is that the numbers generated are only an
approximation and, hence, its application requires a certain degree of experience while
evaluating and assessing scenarios.

Using LOPA to Analyze the Space Shuttle Challenger Disaster
In the case of the Space Shuttle Challenger, the system under consideration is
the Solid Rocket Boosters (SRB) o-ring sealing, which eventually blew up due to the oring’s failure to contain hot gases. Different layers can be designed to capture this
problem at an initial stage, as per the LOPA model (Damle & Murray, 2012). Exhibit 5
and Exhibit 6 show the layers developed for the Challenger Disaster.
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Exhibit 5: LOPA Model for Challenger Disaster (Damle & Murray, 2012)
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Exhibit 6: Layer Definitions and Flow (Damle & Murray, 2012)

The following demonstrates how NASA could have applied the LOPA technique
to the Space Shuttle.
Layer 1 – Testing
Each component going into the Space Shuttle is tested prior to delivery at the vendor’s
location. In this case, SRBs have to be tested as per test plans by NASA. Any conditions
beyond the testing specifications should be deemed risky and retesting at new parameters
has to be carried out before any decision is made.
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Layer 2 – Communication
Any observation made during testing should be documented and clearly communicated to
all persons involved. Any discrepancy or non-conformity should be immediately flagged
and necessary actions should be recommended through two-way communication with the
end user (NASA). Any phone calls should also be logged so that they can be referred to
in the future, in case issues arise later.
Layer 3 – Safety Environment
There needs to be an inherent safety environment within the organization. Any problem,
when detected should be brought to the notice of immediate superiors, while critical
issues should be escalated before it is too late in the process. With a safety environment,
every employee is safety concerned and works towards making the entire system as safe
as possible. The voice of every employee regarding safety matters should be given due
attention.
Layer 4 – Risk Management Plan
There is usually a risk management plan in place. The most crucial aspect of the plan is to
adhere to the severity definitions and the risk matrix. Risk assessment should be carried
out using a comprehensive method for identifying potential failures and a specific
quantitative methodology should be used to assess safety risks (National Research
Council, 1988). The criticality of any risk should not be downgraded, especially when
human life is at stake. Waivers should only be issued under extremely special conditions
and should need to have multiple signatories including top management. It should not be
a norm to issue waivers for small issues, which might eventually lead to bigger problems.
As recommended by the presidential committee, all contractors should review high
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criticality items and improve them prior to flight. An audit panel should verify the
adequacy of the report and report directly to the Administrator of NASA (U.S.
Presidential Commission, 1986).
Layer 5 - Flight Readiness Review
The Flight Readiness Review (FRR) is a meeting of all teams and management to check
if all components are in place for a launch. This also includes confirming that the parts
are manufactured to specifications. Managers provide evidence that all work to prepare a
Space Shuttle for flight was done as required. This is a crucial meeting and the FRR
should be used to escalate issues if they were not addressed by immediate supervisors.
Considering the criticality of the risk involved, there should be no concessions on
specifications or quality of work. Lack of sufficient test data for the given conditions
should not be interpreted as a go ahead for application.
Layer 6 – Launch Commit Criteria
This is the final check before any Space Shuttle takes flight. A formal prelaunch weather
briefing is held two days prior to launch (NASA, 2010). This includes weather data
specifications including temperature, winds, cloud ceilings, and thunderstorms. These
criteria specify the weather limits at which launch can be conducted. These criteria
should be strictly followed, and no waivers should be allowed based on pressures from
external factors. Launching in spite of bad weather conditions is a decision that most
certainly increases the risk of a major disaster.
The Probability to Fail on Demand (PFD) is difficult to determine at this stage. In
the Challenger case, loss of life is the consequence. Thus, the severity of consequence is
very high and criticality is maximal. But, there are no typical initiating event frequencies,
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as there is no historical data. The frequency of the consequence occurrence depends on
probability to fail on demand (PFD) of every protection layer. For the cases considered,
the protection layers are not engineering systems or devices. Hence, their PFDs cannot be
determined in a manner prescribed in LOPA methodology.

Human Factors Analysis and Classification System and the Swiss Cheese Model
The Human Factors Analysis and Classification System (HFACS) was developed
to analyze the U.S. Navy’s aviation accidents. It uses James Reason’s Swiss Cheese
Model for its basic structure. Early in the 1990s, the U.S. Navy was undergoing a high
rate of accidents, and 80% of the accidents were due to human error (Shappell &
Wiegmann, The Human Factors Analysis and Classification System - HFACS, 2000).
Human error is a significant cause of catastrophic accidents in many industries
(Hollywell, 1996). Investigating why human errors occur can be essential to find an
accident’s roots cause(s). The more general form of this process-based tool, the Swiss
Cheese Model, will be used for the discussion and application in this paper.
The Swiss Cheese Model was developed by James Reason (1997) to address
accidents in complex systems where many components interact with each other. The
model tracks accident causation at different levels of the organization without blaming
individuals. The Swiss Cheese Model determines the true causes of an accident by
linking different contributing factors into a rational sequence that runs bottom-up in
causation and top-down in investigation (Reason, Managing the Risks of Organizational
Accidents, 1997). Reason presents his model as stacked slices of Swiss cheese, where the
slices represent the defenses and safeguards of the system, and the holes represent active

46
failures (i.e., unsafe acts) and latent conditions. Unsafe acts occur when a human is in
direct contact with the system, such as during the Chernobyl accident where the operator
wrongly violated the plant procedures and switched off successive safety systems. Latent
conditions can occur at any level of the organization or any system and are harder to
detect. Examples of latent conditions include lack of training, poor design, inadequate
supervision, and unnoticed defects in manufacturing (Reason, 1997). Latent conditions
are considered the source of ignition of any accident or error (Reason, 2000).
The holes in the model are not static. They move from one position to another,
and they may open or close and change in size continuously depending on the situation
and the system climate. According to Dekker, it is the investigator’s job to find out the
position, type, source, and size of each hole and identify the cause of these changes
(Dekker, 2002). Finally, the investigator must determine how the holes line up to produce
accidents since all holes must align through all the defensive layers for the trajectory to
pass through and cause an adverse event. Exhibit 7 shows the original version of the
model containing five layers, namely decision makers, line management, preconditions,
productive activities, and defenses.
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Exhibit 7: Adapted from Reason’s Swiss Cheese Model
Decision
Makers
Latent
Conditions

Line
Management

Precondition
s

Active
Failures

Productive
Activities
Defenses

Latent
Conditions

Adverse Events

The enhanced version of the model is not limited to certain numbers of defensive
layers nor are they labeled or specified by Reason. Thus, a variety of defense layers and
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safeguards can be adapted to this model from different organizational environments
depending on the amount of risk involved. Unfortunately, the model does not specifically
explain the relationship between the various contributing factors, which may result in
unreliable use of the model (Luxhoj & Kauffeld, 2003). Wiegmann and Shappell (2003)
conducted a study to identify the holes and safeguards for an aviation system. They were
able to precisely target each defensive layer and classify its holes (unsafe acts and latent
conditions). They categorize the layers into four levels of human failure where each layer
influenced the succeeding. Exhibit 8 illustrates the HFACS model with proposed
defensive layers for the aviation industry.
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Exhibit 8: The HFACS framework (Shappell, Detwiler, Holcomb, Hackworth,
Boquet, & Wiegmann, 2007)

Using the Swiss Cheese Model to Analyze the Space Shuttle Challenger Disaster
To examine the Challenger Accident using Reason’s Swiss Cheese Model (1990),
the “layer of cheese” must first be identified.
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Productive Activities
Errors in the launch of the Space Shuttle Challenger were unintentional. Blame
cannot be attributed to a pilot, crewmember, operator, or controller. The incident was due
to poor decision-making at the upper management level, which constitutes an unsafe act
under the decision error type (Orasanu, 1993). The commander and pilot flying the Space
Shuttle are considered the direct operators, but in the Challenger Disaster, it was not their
choice whether or not to launch; it was the decision of leaders not on board the shuttle.
Therefore, the unsafe act defensive layer might not be applicable for the
Challenger Accident. This layer would be removed from the model for this application.
However, according to the Swiss Cheese Model, it takes both active failures and latent
conditions for the trajectory to pass through the defensive layers and cause an accident.
Therefore, removing an essential layer might invalidate the model since the error
was not made at the operational level.

Preconditions
Preconditions are the latent conditions/failures that contributed towards
occurrence of an accident, such as the poor weather conditions on the day of the launch.
For a successful reseal of the o-ring, the environmental temperature should be ≥ 53°F.
According to Thiokol, low temperature would jeopardize the capability of the
secondary sealing of the Solid Rocket Motor (Kerzner, 2009). Communicating that issue
was complicated by the fact that engineers use technical jargon that is not always
understood by upper management. Moreover, the ice on the launch pad introduced
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additional risk factors to the launch operation. The ice also covered the handrails and
walkways surrounding the Space Shuttle, which presented hindrances to emergency
access. In addition, availability of spare parts, physical dimensions, material
characteristics, and effects of reusability were other factors that may have contributed to
the disaster.

Line Management
Line management did not adequately enforce the safety program (Kerzner, 2009).
As a result, all risks were treated as anomaly and that became the norm in the NASA
culture.

An escape system during launch was not designed due to overconfidence

in the reliability of the Space Shuttle and a belief that having an escape plan would be
cost prohibitive. A latent failure introduced an unsafe act, which violated the most
important factor: the safety of the crew. Pressure to launch on the designated schedule
due to competition, politics, media, and Congressional issues made it hard for line
managers to communicate the engineers’ concerns and reports to top decision makers and
administrators. Problems that were discussed internally at Thiokol and NASA were not
adequately communicated between the two organizations due to lack of problem
reporting procedures. The lack of communication introduced a latent failure.

Decision Makers
Budget was a major constraint at NASA at the time. Consequently, top
management at NASA approved the design of the solid rocket motor in its entirety,
including the o-ring joint, even when this meant changing the research direction at a great

52
cost. Risk was accepted at all levels since calculated safety projections were favorable. A
NASA position for permanent administrator was empty for four months prior to the
accident, and turnover rate of upper management was relatively high; this added to the
communication breakdown from the top down. Moreover, the lack of communication
between NASA’s top decision makers and Thiokol’s technical engineers introduced a gap
where problem reporting remained in house. Concerns never reached top officials in
NASA for fear of job loss. Moreover, bad news was generally downplayed to protect the
interests of higher officials. In general, there was no accepted standard for problem
reporting that transected all levels of either NASA or Thiokol. There was no clear
recommendation from Thiokol not to launch under the cold weather condition (Kerzner,
2009). According to the U.S. Presidential Commission, (1986) regarding the launch
decision, “Those who made that decision were unaware of the recent history of problems
concerning the o-rings and the joint and were unaware of the initial written
recommendation of the contractor advising against the launch at temperatures below 53
degrees Fahrenheit and the continuing opposition of the engineers at Thiokol after
management reversed its position. They did not have a clear understanding of Rockwell's
concern that it was not safe to launch because of ice on the pad. If the decision makers
had known all of the facts, it is highly unlikely that they would have decided to launch
51-L on January 28, 1986.” The general lack of communication, both between NASA and
Thiokol and internally within each organization, functions as a latent condition.
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Process-Based Risk Assessment Tool Summary
The layers of LOPA clearly expose the problems with launching the Challenger
Shuttle. It can be seen that management pressures and external political pressures forced
decisions to be made by violating systems and risk management measures that were in
place. In spite of the pressure situation, the decision makers at NASA should have
followed the risk management plan and taken into account issues raised by engineers
regarding safety of the Space Shuttle. Focusing only on technical safety without
consideration of decision making and human errors, can cause catastrophes, as was the
case with this accident. To reduce such incidents in future, the role of human factors in
system safety should not be neglected, but instead, should be addressed with priority.
When closely examining the output of LOPA, this model can be effective in
identifying the key high risk stages and mitigating the problem at an early stage, with the
incorporation of control points, procedural checks, regulations at different stages, and
finally consequence response guidelines. Once the challenge of determining the
probabilities can be overcome through acceptable assumptions, LOPA can be a powerful
tool for project managers and risk managers in reducing the chances of a hazard
occurrence.
From the Swiss Cheese Model, the Space Shuttle Challenger’s holes (active
failures) were not identified in sufficient time for safeguards to be implemented to
prevent such catastrophic loss. Moreover, there was no active failure involved in the
front-end layer of defense; all decisions were made from the top management level of the
organization. With the miscommunication that occurred between NASA and Thiokol, the
administrators at NASA were not aware of the potential risk that was involved with the
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launch decision. As a result, the unsafe acts layer of defense was discarded, resulting in a
critical flaw in the Swiss Cheese Model—without the provisions to counteract or override
unsafe acts, the model is inadequate for accident prevention. Further investigation is
needed to determine whether another model may be more successful in addressing
complex systems such as the NASA Space Shuttle launch, in terms of identifying risk
factors and predicting potential accidents. The Swiss Cheese Model was applied
successfully to the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill Incident (Altabbakh & Murray, Applying The
Swiss Cheese Model of Accident Causation, 2011). Both active failures and latent
conditions combined and caused a catastrophic adverse event. The active failures were
due to multiple front line operators including the captain of the vessel and the crew
members. Unsafe acts were considered both error and violations in the Exxon Valdez Oil
Spill Incident (Altabbakh & Murray, Applying The Swiss Cheese Model of Accident
Causation, 2011).

Conclusion
After a comprehensive evaluation of the different risk management models
applied to the Space Shuttle Challenger Disaster, we can conclude that these techniques
are effective for a given scope of risk identification and varying times during the system
lifecycle. While FMEA, FTA, and RED address risks at the component and sub-system
level, the Swiss Cheese Model addresses risks related to human system interaction.
LOPA considers the system in its entirety and designs defense layers to protect the
system from an undesirable consequence.
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FMEA strives to identify all possible failure modes and identifies a critical item
list based on the criticality definitions. This can be used at an initial design phase to
prevent the occurrence of failure modes and take measures according to the
occurrence/severity ratings. RED can assist designers in identifying the potential risks
associated with the product at the conceptual phase based on a historical stored data,
which reduce the subjectivity of the decision made with regards to the likelihood and the
consequences of failure modes. FTA considers all possible causes leading to an adverse
event. Engineering managers can check their system stability to make sure all causes
have been addressed. The logic gates make FTA an effective visual tool. However, FTA
is dependent on the individual constructing the FTA, and there can be multiple ways of
doing so. FMEA does not consider any failure modes resulting from normal operation.
Both FMEA and FTA fail to consider human error as a probable cause of failure.
Managers need to be aware that these techniques can be fairly time consuming
and lengthy and hence demand more resources and longer working time frames.
If design changes are not feasible due to financial, technical, or other restrictions,
managers can explore the possibility of using risk management models, which consider
risks in a broader perspective. The Swiss Cheese Model has a specific set of identified
defenses designed to expose the shortcomings within the system when human system
interaction is involved. It gives considerable weight to human errors and human factors
when identifying risks. The most valuable contribution of this model is that it also
considers precursors to unsafe actions, which can help in identifying problems with the
inherent system construction and hierarchy. The holes in the defenses change according
to the system or industry under consideration. This model can be used at a later stage
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during operation of the system. Since it has pre-specified defenses, this model may not be
applicable to certain systems. It also fails to identify a cause that is unrelated to the
system (involving human) under consideration.
Layer of Protection Analysis (LOPA), a process risk management technique, uses
identified hazards to build defensive layers around the system under consideration. It is
easy to deploy because of its scenario-based approach. This technique allows managers to
not only prevent and protect a system, but also to mitigate the effects of a consequence.
No other model considers designing defenses for a post-disaster scenario to
control the after-effects of the undesirable event. LOPA can be used to include not just
component risks, but risks related to organizational issues and human factors. It can guide
or provide a best practice context, when considering generic projects. Managers need to
note that LOPA requires pre-identified hazards to begin the analysis. The model does not
consider basic component risks, but is broader, encompassing system/organization wide
issues. A primary drawback is that it is project-specific, and there are no existing
references of past applications. The application of this model requires experience due to
its semi-quantitative nature.
Engineering managers should note that there is no one single perfect model for
risk assessment. Exhibit 9 summarizes the risk assessment tools discussed in this article
by identifying the pros and cons of each tool/method. The manager has to use sound
judgment in deciding which method is appropriate for the project. The factors that can
affect the decision to select a particular model include industry type, phase in the
product/system lifecycle, time and resources available for risk assessment, and
scope/level to which risks need to be identified. If risk is to be assessed at the core
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component level, FMEA, FTA, and RED are useful. If human errors and organizational
shortcomings need to be captured, the Swiss Cheese Model or/and LOPA are useful. If
overall safety of the system needs to be ensured, then LOPA is a useful technique to use.

Exhibit 9: Summary of Risk Assessment Tools
Risk
Advantages

Assessment

Disadvantages

Tool
Failure Mode and Effects

-

Analysis

Very efficient if applied to
the system as a whole
Structured, detailed
approach
Prioritizes product/process
deficiencies
Identifies and eliminates
potential failure modes early
in the development phases
-

Fault Tree
Analysis

-

Risk in Early
Design

-

Visual, depicts the causeand-effect relationship
between the root cause
events
Provides Both qualitative
and quantitative results
Concentrates on one
particular failure at a time

-

Utilizes historical
knowledgebase to produce
potential risks
Well-suited for novice
engineers
Identifies risk in the early
design phase

-

-

-

Not easy to build if the system
consists of a number of
components with multiple
functions
Only considers hazards that lead
to failure, does not consider
hazards that result from normal
operations
Time consuming, expensive to
build and very detailed
Does not consider failures
resulting from human error
Does not capture all failure
related to human due to the
complexity of human behavior
Time consuming and lengthy
Latent hazards are not addressed
Requires an expert to identify
potential risks
Potential risk may be over or
under quantified
Does not account for human
error
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-

Layer of
Protection
Analysis

-

Swiss Cheese
Model

-

Identifies risks encountered
in the entire system, broader
approach
Easy to apply and very
effective in exposing
systemic problems
Accounts for human error
Semi quantitative
Takes less time to evaluate
complex systems
qualitatively

-

Tracks accident causations
at different levels of the
organization
Does not blame individuals

-

-

-

The quantified output is an
approximation
Requires experience in
approximation of risk numbers

Applicable only when human
interacts with the system
Does not expose component
level issues
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Abstract

Risk management has a number of accident causation models that have been used
for a number of years. Dr. Nancy Leveson (2002) has developed a new model of
accidents using a systems approach.

The new model is called Systems Theoretic

Accident Modeling and Processes (STAMP). It incorporates three basic components:
constraints, hierarchical levels of control, and process loops. In this model, accidents are
examined in terms of why the controls that were in place did not prevent or detect the
hazard(s) and why these controls were not adequate to enforcing the system safety
constraints. A STAMP accident analysis is presented and its usefulness in evaluating
system safety is compared to more traditional risk models. STAMP will be applied to a
case study in the oil industry to demonstrate the practicality and validity of the model.

Keywords
Risk assessment, Accident causation, Hazard analysis, Human error, Complex Systems
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1. Introduction
Researchers in the safety field are facing more challenges everyday with the
expanding modern socio-technical systems. Safety analysis such as hazard analysis,
accident causation analysis, and risk assessment are being revisited to overcome the
shortcoming of the conventional safety analysis. With increasingly complex human
system interaction in today’s modern systems, new safety challenges are been faced that
needed to be assessed and addressed. Indeed, new or improved risk assessment tools that
can address these complexities are needed.

2. Hazard Analysis
Hazard analyses are tools used to detect and classify hazards within a system,
subsystem, components, and their interactions. The main purpose of the analysis is to
identify hazardous conditions or risks and eliminate them or mitigate them (Federal
Aviation Administration, 2008). Hazard analyses identify hazards, their consequences,
and their causes to determine system risk and means of mitigating or eliminating those
hazards (Ericson, 2005). Ericson categorized hazard analyses into types and techniques.
Types would typically determine analysis timing, depth of details and system
coverage; while techniques would specify the methodology used in the analysis. There
are seven types of hazard analysis with regards to system safety (Ericson, 2005):
•

Conceptual design hazard analysis type (CD-HAT) (concept)

•

Preliminary design hazard analysis type (PD-HAT) (preliminary)

•

Detailed design hazard analysis type (DD-HAT) (preliminary)

•

System design hazard analysis type (SD-HAT) (test)
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•

Operations design hazard analysis type (OD-HAT) (test)

•

Health design hazard analysis type (HD-HAT) (operation)

•

Requirements design hazard analysis type (RD-HAT) (final design)

Each category describes a stage of system life, details required from analyses,
information available to begin with, and analysis outcome. There are more than 100
hazard analysis techniques available (Stephens & Talso, 1999; Federal Aviation
Administration, 2008).
Hazards analysis not only identifies what could fail in a system, but also identifies
the potential consequences, the reason why it could happen, what are the causal factors,
and the likelihood of it happening. Unfortunately, conventional hazard analyses are more
focused on direct cause and effect relationship following the famous dominos chain of
events (Hollnagel, 2004).

There are several techniques for hazard analysis to be

considered when assessing hazards in a system. Failure Mode and Effect Analysis
(FMEA), Fault Tree Analysis (FTA), Event Tree Analysis (ETA), and Hazard and
Operability Analysis (HAZOP) are examples of the traditional ones.

However, the

available tools are not designed to accommodate all the different complex systems
available. It is the job of the analyst to choose the model that best fit the system under
investigation. Depending on the type of risks to be assessed, whether risks at components
level, human error, human machine interaction or organizational level (Altabbakh et al,
2012). An overview of each of the methods is discussed below.
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2.1 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA) is a bottom up inductive (forward
approach) risk assessment tool that can be used to identify failure modes that would
negatively impact the overall system. FMEA is classified as a DD-HAT type of hazard
analysis. It evaluates the effect of these potential failure modes to determine if changes
are necessary at any stage of the system to overcome such adverse events (Ericson,
2005). It is very advantageous to apply FMEA at early stages of the system to increase
safety since changes, if suggested by FMEA, can be with minimal cost (Dhillon, 1999).
On the other hand, FMEA emphasizes on single failure in isolation and it is not
geared toward multiple failures in combination although some hazards arise from other
multiple hazards or events and not necessarily mechanical or electrical failure modes
(Ericson, 2005). Another drawback is that FMEA does not account for failures that occur
due to human error in complex systems (Foster, et al., 1999). In addition, FMEA is
considered time consuming due to the detailed structure of the analysis.

2.2 Fault Tree Analysis
Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) is a top down deductive (backward approach) risk
assessment tool that determines failures and contributing factors of adverse events in a
system. FTA is classified as a DS-HAT and DD-HAT hazards analysis type. Fault trees
employ graphical diagrams and logic gates to represent the relationship between failures
and other events in the system and its primary objective is to identify the causal factors of
a hazard in the system. Fault trees are based on root cause analysis and they depict the
cause effect relationships between the root cause events visually (Ericson, 2005). In spite
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of the fact that fault trees requires that analysts study systems under investigation
thoroughly to eliminate overlooking potential risks factors (Dhillon, 1999), it still lacks
the ability to capture human error due to the complexity of human behavior that will
complicate the analysis (Kirwan & Ainsworth, 1992). In addition, due to its lengthy
details nature, fault trees consume time and accumulate size, which makes it hard to form
into reliability reports.

2.3 Event Tree Analysis
Event Tree Analysis (ETA) is a bottom up inductive risk analysis technique that
identifies and evaluates potential accident and its possible related chain of events
(Ericson, 2005; Khan & Abbasi, 1998). ETA is classified as a SD-HAT type of hazard
analysis. The analysis starts with an initiating event and goes further in evaluating every
possible outcome that can results accordingly. Safety constraints are evaluated in each
path (accident scenario) whether they are enforced adequately or needs to be addressed in
order for the selected path to execute smoothly without a failure or an accident. Event
trees are easy to learn and apply and they combine human, machine, environment, and
human interaction (Ericson, 2005). Unfortunately, event trees only allow one initiating
event at one time. Multiple initiating events will have different trees, which will be time
consuming and trees will be lengthy.

2.4 Hazard and Operability Analysis
	
  

HAZard	
   and	
   OPerability	
   analysis	
   (HAZOP)	
   is	
   a	
   technique	
   that	
   is	
   used	
   to	
  

identify	
  hazards	
  in	
  a	
  system	
  to	
  prevent	
  adverse	
  events.	
  (Kletz,	
  1999).	
  	
  It	
  is	
  classified	
  

68
as	
  a	
  PD-‐HAT	
  and	
  the	
  DD-‐HAT	
  hazard	
  analysis	
  type.	
  	
  It	
  starts	
  with	
  a	
  brainstorming	
  
session	
   where	
   concerned	
   people	
   in	
   an	
   organization	
   will	
   use	
   their	
   imagination	
   to	
  
determine	
   all	
   possible	
   scenarios	
   where	
   hazards	
   or	
   failure	
   might	
   occur,	
   in	
   a	
  
systematic	
   way	
   (Kletz,	
   1999).	
   	
   HAZOP	
   is	
   useful	
   to	
   apply	
   to	
   systems	
   that	
   involve	
  
human	
  performance	
  and	
  behavior	
  or	
  any	
  system	
  that	
  involve	
  hazards	
  that	
  are	
  hard	
  
to	
   quantify	
   or	
   detect.	
   On	
   the	
   other	
   hand,	
   HAZOP	
   does	
   not	
   take	
   into	
   account	
   the	
  
cognitive ability of human as of why they would commit an unsafe act, which is a
weakness point of HAZOP. Thus, HAZOP analysis is not standardized worldwide,
hence, the analysis is performed differently with variation in results for the same system
(Pérez-Marín & Rodríguez-Toral, 2013). Moreover,	
  HAZOP	
  study	
  does	
  not	
  take	
  into	
  
account	
   the	
   interaction	
   between	
   different	
   component	
   in	
   a	
   system	
   or	
   a	
   process	
  
(Product	
   Quality	
   Research	
   Institute,	
   2013),	
   and	
   it	
   also	
   can	
   be	
   lengthy,	
   time	
  
consuming	
  and	
  expensive	
  (Redmill,	
  2002).	
  

3. System Theoretic Accident Model and Processes - Introduction
System-Theoretic Accident Model and Processes (STAMP) is a new
comprehensive accident causation model created by Dr. Nancy Leveson to analyze
accidents in systems (Leveson, A New Accident Model for Engineering Safer Systems,
2004). Leveson suggested that with the evolving changes in technology since WWII and
the emerging massive complexity of systems components a new approach is needed to
overcome such pitfalls of traditional accident models.

Rapid speed of technology

revolution and digitalized systems, introduced new types of accidents and hazards.
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Accordingly the human system integration relationship is becoming more complex.
System analysis is useful when analyzing complex accident involving software,
organization hierarchical and management, human limitations including decision-making
and cognitive complexity. Traditional accident causation models lack the ability to
investigate such complex systems. Not only can STAMP be used to analyze existent
accidents, but also it can be utilized to design for a safer system during the system
development stage to prevent accidents (Leveson, 2003). STAMP views systems as
dynamic processes with continuous changes with respect to product/process design,
management, technologies, workforce and such.

At the design stage, STAMP

emphasizes enforcing not only safety constraints to the existent design, but also for future
change and adaptation such as change of technologies, nature of accidents, type and
nature of hazards, complexity of human system interaction, and safety regulations
(Leveson, 2004).
Most conventional accident causation models view an accident as a result of a
series of events adapted from the Domino Theory (Hollnagel, 2004), where one event
leads to the next. Using this approach, efforts are made by investigators to identify the
first adverse event in the chain and prevent it from happening without considering
environmental, organizational, or human contributions. FMEA, FTA, ETA, and CauseConsequence Analysis are based on this approach (Leveson, 1995). They do not work
well for complex system involving human behavior because they are based on linear
chain of events and assume accident is a result of a component failure not accounting for
accident happening where all components are compromised without failure (Hollnagel,
2004). A common drawback of these conventional chain based accident models is that
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once the root cause was identified, the blame tends to be assigned (often to the operator)
and the analysis stops (Leveson, 2004).
The three main principles of STAMP are safety constraints, hierarchical control
structure, and process models (Leveson, 2012). First, safety constraints are enforced
through safety controls, which if adequately implemented will prevent adverse events
from happening. An example of safety constraints in the Space Shuttle Challenger would
be that the temperature should be greater than or equal to 53 degrees in order for the
shuttle to launch (Kerzner, 2009). Second, hierarchical control structure represent an
essential step in applying STAMP where each level of the system contributes to the
safety or to accidents in a system. Each level of the hierarchy enforce safety constraints
to the level below it, and each level below have to give feedback on how these constraint
are successfully implemented or ineffectively failed. Consequently, higher levels of
hierarchy are responsible of the performance of the lower levels through enforcing safety
constraints. Missing constraints, inadequate safety control command, commands not
executed properly at lower level, or inadequate feed back communications about
constraints are the main reasons of inadequate controls. Third, four conditions must exist
for a process to be controlled under STAMP model (Leveson, 2012). Goal (enforcing
safety constraints in each level of the hierarchy structure by controllers), Action
Condition (implement actions downward the hierarchy structure), Observatory condition
(Upward the hierarch), and model condition (the controller’s model of the process being
controlled), which in our case is the process model. Essentially, without the latter one, a
process would not adequately be controlled.
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Unlike traditional accident causation models where the root cause consist of an
event or chain of events, STAMP focus on investigating the cause of an accident by
identifying the safety control that were inadequately enforced, or sometimes not enforced
at all (Leveson, 2012). Accidents therefore are considered as a result of interactions
among system components and the lack of control of safety related constraints, no blame
is pointed to a single component nor blame pointed towards and individual human
(Leveson, Daouk, Dulac, & Marais, 2003). For example, in the Space Shuttle Challenger
Disaster, the main cause for the accident was the faulty of the solid rocket booster (SRB)
o-ring seal. However, applying system approach risk assessment models revealed more
contributing factors such as decision makers, line managements, politics, safety
environment, and ineffective communication (Altabbakh, Murray, Damle, & Grantham,
2012). Furthermore, STAMP would continue the analysis with questions such as, why
did the o-ring fail to adequately control the released propellant gas?

In STAMP,

accidents are not viewed as failures; instead they represent violation of safety constraints.
They can occur when existing safety controls are missing or ineffective. Thus the
safety of a system is considered a control problem, a control of the safety constraint. Dr.
Leveson explains, “Accidents occur when external disturbances, component failures, or
dysfunctional interactions among system components are not adequately handled by the
control system (Leveson, 2004).”

3.1 STAMP Analysis
Unlike conventional accident causation models, STAMP is not based on chain of
events. It is based on system theory where each level or the organization plays a major
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role in contributing to an accident or attaining successful system safety controls. Thus
STAMP prevails conventional accident models by accounting for organizational factors,
human error, and adaptation to change over time. In STAMP, system safety is not
achieved by preventing component failure measures; in fact, it is achieved by enforcing
safety constraints continuously (Leveson, 2004).

Therefore, accidents do not occur

because of failure of components, they occur because of ineffective safety constraint
where main focus is not on how to prevent failure, but on how to design better safety
controls.
STAMP has been utilized to analyze multiple post accidents (Leveson, 2002)
(Leveson & Laracy, 2007). Studies showed that utilizing STAMP to analyze accidents
have revealed more hazards and potential failures in systems than other traditional hazard
analysis or accident causation models (Song, 2012). Figure 1 depicts the taxonomy of
contributory factors in accidents by investigative each component of a control loop and
identifying how each component’s, if improperly operated, can add to the inadequacy of
safety control.
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Figure 1: Classification of Control Flaws Leading to Hazards (Leveson,
2012).
Causal factors have been divided into three main categories. The controller
operation, the behavior of actuators and controlled processes, and communication and
coordination among controllers and decision makers.

Figure 2 shows the general

classification of the flaws in the components of the system development and system
operations control loops during design, development, manufacturing, and operations
(Leveson, 2004). This classification can be applied to all levels of the organization under
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investigation during accident analysis or as an accident prevention to prevent future or
potential adverse events.
1. Inadequate enforcements of constraints (control actions)
1.1. Unidentified hazards
1.2. Inappropriate, ineffective or missing control actions for identified hazards
1.2.1. Design of control algorithm (process) does not enforce constraints
—Flaws in creation process
—Process changes without appropriate change in control algorithm (asynchronous evolution)
—Incorrect modification or adaptation.
1.2.2. Process models inconsistent, incomplete or incorrect (lack of linkup)
—Flaws in creation process
—Flaws in updating process (asynchronous evolution)
—Time lags and measurement inaccuracies not accounted for
1.2.3. Inadequate coordination among controllers and decision makers
2. Inadequate execution of control action
2.1. Communication flaw
2.2. Inadequate actuator operation
2.3. Time lag
3. Inadequate or missing feedback
3.1. Not provided in system design
3.2. Communication flow
3.3. Time lag
3.4. Inadequate sensor operation (incorrect or no information provided

Figure 2: Classification of Control Flaws Leading to Hazards (Leveson,
2004)
For each level of the hierarchy, the three main categories should be investigated
and determine their contribution to the accident (Leveson, 2004):
•

Control actions: inadequate handling of control actions by controllers

•

Execution of control action: inadequate execution of action
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•

Feedback: missing or inadequate feedback and communication
Another category can be added if humans are involved in the organization being

investigated, which is the context in which the decision has been made and influenced the
behavior mechanism (Leveson, 2004). Figure 3 is an example the structure of STAMP
analysis for one level of the hierarchy (Leveson, Daouk, Dulac, & Marais, 2003).

Figure 3: Accident Causal Factor of Provincial Governments - the
Walkerton Water Contamination Accident (Leveson, Daouk, Dulac, &
Marais, 2003)
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4. Applying STAMP to an accident in the Oil and Gas Industry
XYZ is a major oil company that handles crude oil production operations. Two
separate crude oil processing facilities, (A) and (B), collect the crude oil from a
constellation of near-by wells.

The oil is processed to meet market physical

characteristics and chemical composition prior to sending it to storage tanks within the
facility premises. Industrial export pumps are used to send crude oil via a joint a 30”
diameter pipeline to central storage tank farm stationed near-by export harbors and then
shipped to potential customers. Figure 4 illustrated the layout of the two facilities.
During normal operation, and at approximately 9:30 PM, a major accident
occurred that created massive damage due to explosion at crude oil processing facility B.
The accident resulted in fatalities and caused millions of dollars in site damages
as well as production suspension. The cause of the accident was due to an oil leak from a
ruptured export pipeline. A spark ignited the pool of leaking crude oil, illustrated in
figure 5, and resulted in series of massive explosion that destructed the entire facility. In
addition, the accident resulted in the death of two facility operators and severe injuries to
20 contractor employees who were at the scene.
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Figure 4: Layout of crude oil processing facilities (A) and (B)

Ruptured pipeline

Figure 5: Oil leak and in Facility (B)

4.1 The Accident
At 3:40 PM, An electrical malfunction occurred in facility (A) resulted in a
temporary suspension of export operations. This led to a pressure drop in the joint crude
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oil export pipeline.

Operators in facility (A) informed area supervisor as well as

operators in facility (B) to take proper actions in maintaining the pressure until the
malfunction is rectified. Operators in facility (B) partially closed the control flow valve
to maintain, and build up, the operating pressure in the joint export pipeline. In parallel,
the maintenance crew in facility (A) managed to restore the electrical and resume
production operations; hence, increase the pressure in the joint export crude oil pipeline.
Simultaneously, the operators in facility (B) started opening the control flow
valve back to the original position prior to the shutdown of facility (A). This task is to
assist in reducing both the backpressure and the built-up pressure resulting from resuming
production operations in facility (A). Unfortunately, the flow control valve did not fully
open to its original position. As a result, a backflow generated a build-up pressure in the
30-inch joint crude oil export pipeline.
At 9:30 PM, an over pressure in the pipeline resulted in a pipeline rupture and
caused a leak of approximately 18,000 barrel of crude oil for over a period of 2 hours.
Once acknowledged, the operators in Facility (B) immediately pushed Emergency
Shutdown Button. This is a part of Emergency ShutDown System (ESD) is designed to
minimize the consequences of escape of hydrocarbons.

This process consists of

shutdown of equipment, isolate crude oil by containing it storage tanks, and stop
hydrocarbon flow to assure maintain the safety and integrity of the facility.
Unfortunately, the main flow control valve, which is motor operated, failed to
fully shutdown and secure the pipeline from flowing any crude oil back in to the facility.
Hence, the leak continued to flow from the ruptured pipeline. The operators in
facility (B) managed to close the main flow control valve manually and were successful
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in stopping the leak. Yet, the large amount of leaked crude oil was accumulating nearby
an electrical generating station. Since crude oil contains volatile organic fumes and
vapor, and in an effort to prevent any electrical discharge, electrical maintenance
contractors in facility (B) disconnected the electrical power supplied to the power-substation.

Simultaneously, the mechanical maintenance crew utilized vacuum trucks to

collect the spilled crude oil. This resulted in a static electric discharge and caused series
of explosions. The explosions resulted in a total demolition of the facility as well as fires
that lasted more than 16 hours to extinguish. In terms of casualties, the explosion
resulted in the death of four facility operators and severe injuries to 20 contractor
employees who were at the scene.

4.2 Proximity of events:
•

At 3:40 PM, An electrical malfunction occurred in facility (A)

•

Operators in facility (B) tried close the flow control valve

•

Electrical power restored in facility (A)

•

Production resumed in Facility (A)

•

Operator in Facility (B) opened flow control valve

•

Flow control valve did not open to its original position

•

Backflow generated a build-up pressure in the 30-inch joint crude oil export
pipeline

•

30-inch pipeline rupture

•

18,000 barrel of crude oil leak

80
•

Operator in Facility (B) pushed emergency shutdown button

•

Suspend all ongoing operations within the facility and close all valves

•

Flow control valve failed to fully shutdown

•

The leak continued to flow from the ruptured pipeline

•

Assistant Operators in facility (B) manually, close the main flow control valve

•

Leak stopped

•

Leaked crude oil was accumulating nearby an electrical generating station

•

Operators in facility (B) disconnected the electrical power supplied to the power
station

•

Maintenance crew utilized vacuum trucks to collect the spilled crude oil

•

Static electric discharge and caused series of explosions

•

The explosions resulted in a total demolition of the facility

•

Explosion resulted in the death of two facility operators and severe injuries to 20
contractor employees who were at the scene

4.3 Hierarchical Control Structure
Each hierarchical level of the control structure of company XYZ, as depicted in
figure 6, will be discussed in terms of inadequacy of enforcing safety constraint,
inadequacy in executing actions, context, and mental flow.
summary of the discussion above it.

Each box represents a
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Figure 6: Hierarchical Level Control Structure of Company XYZ
Pipeline Mechanical Integrity
•

Oil and gas industry refer to the recommended practices and standards issued by
the American Petroleum Institute for their activities (Thomas, Thorp, & Denham,
1992). The recommended maximum piping inspection interval for crude oil
pipeline is five years as per the Piping inspection code (API 570). "Smart Pigs", a
propelling cylinder-shaped electronic devices inserted into the pipeline, are
utilized to evaluate the metal loss due to corrosion, cracks, and any other anomaly
in the pipeline (Kishawy & Gabbar, 2010). Since the inspection of pipelines
requires the suspension of production, hence, loss of generated profit, operations,
Company XYZ recommended all 30-inch pipelines to undergo routine inspections
every seven years.
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Assistant Facility Operators
•

Assistant facility operators conducted a site visit every 4 hours to collect readings
from various equipment and pressure gauges as part of their routine task. When
reaching the main export transfer pump, an assistant facility operator observed
ruptured pipeline with a pool crude oil leaking. Immediately, he contacted the
facility operator via intrinsically safe radio, a standard means of communication
inside the facility to prevent a spark, to initiate an Emergency ShutDown
procedure by pushing the ESD located in the control room. This is an emergency
standard procedure designed to minimize the consequences of escape of
hydrocarbons in case of an oil leak. Consequently, the rest of the assistant facility
operators started to manually isolate and secure the remaining manually operated
valves to avoid flow of crude oil through pipelines since not all valves within the
facility are motors operated neglecting the main flow control valve.
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Facility (B) Operator
•

The facility (B) operator initiated the emergency shutdown (ESD) procedure and
pushed the (ESD) button located in the control room as per the radio
communication with the assistant facility operator. This procedure closes both
motor and pneumatically operated flow control valves to prevent the flow of
hydrocarbons. Accordingly, facility operator contacted the on-call/off-site facility
(B) supervisor by phone and informed him with the leak as part of the emergency
response procedure.

Facility (B) Supervisor
•

Facility (B) supervisor contacted the Senior Maintenance engineer by phone and
updated him with the ongoing leak in the facility (B)
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•

Facility (B) supervisor contacted the operations superintendent as he was
informed by phone with the oil leak in the facility and action taken by operation
staff

Senior Maintenance Engineer
•

Senior maintenance engineer, who is on-call/off-site, contacted the off-site/on-call
mechanical, electrical, and instrument engineers by phone to contact the offsite/on-call foremen, who perform the onsite activities with the assistance of
maintenance contractor, to head to the facility and rectify the leak by using
pipeline clamps.

These clamps are temporary leak prevention tools secured

around a pipeline.
•

Senior maintenance engineer contacted by the phone the maintenance
superintendent and informed with the leak and action taken by maintenance staff
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Maintenance Engineers:
•

The maintenance engineers contacted their off-site/on-call foremen by phone and
instructed them to deploy the contractor’s mechanical, electrical, and instrument
maintenance crew to rectify the leak.
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Foremen
•

The maintenance foremen (mechanical, electrical, and instrument) contacted the
off-site/on-call maintenance contractor crew to head to facility (B) which took
them approximately an hour and a half to reach the facility.

•

Mechanical maintenance crew was successful to stop the leak by clamping the
ruptured pipeline and using a vacuum tank to gather the leaked crude oil.

•

Electrical/instrument maintenance crew tried isolating the electrical power from
the nearby power-sub-station in a parallel activity with mechanical maintenance.
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Operations and Maintenance Manager
•

The manager of production operations and maintenance contacted by phone both
the emergency response and firefighting team to deploy to facility (B) and assure
that all leak stopping activities are performed safely. The power generation
company is also contacted by the operations and maintenance manager to be
ready to disconnect the power once requested since power to the facility is
supplied by the power-generation-company. In compliance with the emergency
response procedures, both the team and power generation company were updated
with the crude oil leak at facility (B).

•

The executive managing director was contacted by phone and updated with the
leak as well as the action taken by both maintenance and operations staff.
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5. Recommendation
The oil industry utilizes HAZOP risk analysis in its design stages to recognize the
hazard and operability problems in order to minimize the likelihood and consequences of
an incident in the facilities (Flin, Mearns, Fleming, & Gordon, 1996). However, RootCause analysis is considered a fundamental tool to identify causes of accidents within the
oil industry (Vinnem, Hestad, Kvaløy, & Skogdalen, 2010) as investigators utilized it in
the case of facility (B) explosion.

This method identified the causes of explosion as

improper human performance that initiated a spark and ignited the pool of leak. In
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addition, the method went into further details in recognizing the cause of the leak was due
to a ruptured 30 inch export pipeline. Yet, Root-Cause analysis failed to identify any
procedural and hierarchical gaps negatively influenced decision-making and work
performance.
	
  

STAMP analysis revealed several delinquencies in different aspects in Company

XYZ which if identified in proper time; it would have prevented this catastrophe from
occurring. Different levels of the organizational hierarchy contributed to the accident,
where the main cause of the accident was the spark.

Ineffective

safety

policy,

inadequate communication between and within departments, poor supervision, and
improper allocation of resources are some of the factors that contributed in this tragic
accident. Policies and regulations must be implemented in Company XYZ to ensure
safety to human, equipment, and environment.
If the following scenario has been followed, four lives could have been saved and
financial losses in terms lost production, facility reconstruction, workers compensation,
environmental impact, and legal claims/fines could have been avoided. In case of an oil
leak, the assistant facility operators must ensure that all valves are isolated and securely
shut to prevent the flow of any hydrocarbons through the pipelines. Thus, gas monitors
should available with the assistant facility operators to assure that the threshold level of
evaporating hydrocarbon fumes are within recommended safety limit. Consequently,
contact the facility operator to proceed with the emergency shutdown processes to isolate
all motor and pneumatically operated valves. The facility operator, after evaluating the
situation and assuring that all valves are isolated and the facility is safe to perform any
maintenance activity, will contact the facility operations supervisor with details of the
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emergency situation and the emergency procedures that were followed while
emphasizing that the facility is safe for maintenance staff to proceed with their activity.
Concurrently, the facility operator will contact the emergency response and
firefighting team with details of the situation for them to deploy their equipment and staff
to supervise the work to be performed by the maintenance staff. The facility operator
will contact maintenance engineers (mechanical, electrical, and instrument) who are onsite as shift-working-type-base and provide details of the emergency situation as they,
along with the maintenance foremen and maintenance contractors, await for the
emergency response and firefighting team to ensure the safety of the workplace and give
them clearance to proceed with the rectification activities.

Meanwhile, the power

generation company will be notified by the electrical maintenance engineer to be ready
for emergency power shutdown when instructed. This procedure will cut the power
supply for the facility’s power-sub-station. Both the facility operator and maintenance
engineer will update both facility operations supervisor and senior maintenance engineer,
respectively. Hence, both the facility operations supervisor and the senior maintenance
engineer will inform both the production operations superintendent and the maintenance
superintendent who will be in touch with the operations and maintenance manager with
status update as they assure that all safety procedures are emphasized and followed to
prevent undesired accidents.
All effort from different levels of the hierarchy must collaborate to design a safer
system in the company. Policies and procedures should be revised, new regulations must
be established, implemented to assure that the previous scenario be active and
understood. Finally, procedures and policy should be designed to accommodate the
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complexity of the human mind, machine components, software, environment, and the
interaction among them.
6. Conclusion
STAMP goes beyond the conventional accident causation methods by pinpointing
the reasons at human performance and component failure and takes it to another level of
investigation. STAMP goes beyond acknowledging these factors and adds organizational
hierarchy, working practices, and the roles and responsibility of each staff member in the
organization. STAMP was simple to apply in the oil industry case study above without
the need for special analytical skills or expertise, which can be a value added to the
analysis, to identify the safety violations resulted in the catastrophe.

However, for

STAMP to be successful, it is essential for the user to have access to some essential
information. The organization’s hierarchy can assist in identifying their contribution to
the safety constraint violation in terms of their influence to their subordinates. Policies,
standards, and regulations that shape work practices and how activities are performed is
key information in detecting improper task execution. The roles and responsibilities of
each staff members identify the flow of communication channels used and how decisions
made and conveyed to the lower hierarchy. Having this information will build a body of
knowledge enabling the user to recognize limitations in each safety constraint level and
where they have been violated in each hierarchical level.
STAMP identifies the violations against the existence safety constraints at each
level of the control structure and investigates why these controls have not been
adequately enforced or if they were adequately designed originally..

The method

outperforms other accident causation models by considering all levels of complex
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systems including environment, human error, physical component failure, the context in
which the accident happen, and the interrelationship between components, machine,
human and other components of the system. The model is easy to apply in accident
investigation and it provides a clear guidance for investigators to conduct the analysis.
STAMP has proven that it can be applied to different environment such as
aerospace systems (Leveson, 2004), U.S. Army friendly fire shootings (Leveson, Allen,
& Storey, 2002), water contamination accident (Leveson, Daouk, Dulac, & Marais,
2003), aviation (Nelson, 2008) (Hickey, 2012), financial crises (Spencer, 2012), and
medical industry (Balgos, 2012). STAMP is a useful holistic model to apply in complex
system. Hickey states, compared to other accident causation models, STAMP will reveal
more causal factors contributing to accidents (Hickey, 2012).
Traditional accident analyses are more focused on sequence of events leading to a
root cause. Once that root is identified all effort will be applied to eliminate it, which
does not necessarily eliminate other causes from arising. STAMP in contrast is more
focused on enforcing safety constraints behavior in systems rather than preventing
failures. Accidents are viewed as a result of inadequate safety control. Moreover,
STAMP assist in recognizing scenarios, inadequate controls, the dysfunctional
interaction, and the incorrect process models, which will be used in process design for a
safer system.
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ABSTRACT
Accidents among young engineers in school’s workshops and labs are relatively
frequent, among which were severe injuries and tragic fatalities. Students participate in
various engineering design competition teams where they spend time in labs and/or
workshops and other hazardous environment. Consequently, underestimating the safety
mindset, which is essential in various phases of any project. These engineers will be part
of a task force and progress in ranking within the organization and inherit a safety culture
for the younger engineers to pursue. In an effort to prevent such accidents and improve
safety cognition in young engineers, this study examines the training exposure and
knowledge within engineering competition teams from the students’ perspectives. A
survey targeting different OSHA safety areas was conducted to measure safety attitudes
of these young engineers. The paper, also, explores potential causes that can prevent
these engineers from making appropriate decisions from a safety prospective.
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INTRODUCTION
Young engineers who participate in various design teams spend time in their
workshops where they encounter different types of hazardous and flammable materials,
machines, and other hazardous environment. In addition, other young scientists undergo
lab experiments as part of their curricular. However, without the adequate amount and
utilizing of safety knowledge, these young engineers are vulnerable to avoidable tragic
accidents. In the past decade, there have been great concern regarding the frequency of
academic laboratory accidents occurring across the country, among which were severe
injuries and deaths. A graduate student lost three fingers, burned his hands and face, and
injured one of his eyes at a chemistry lab at Texas Tech university (U.S. Chemical Safety
and Hazard Investigation Board, 2010). Another 23 year old female student died of
second and third degree burns over 43% of her body while doing a research experiment
in the UCLA lab (Christensen, 2009). An unfortunate student died of asphyxiation due to
neck compression when her hair got caught in one of Yale University’s shop’s lathe
machine (Henderson, Rosenfeld, & Serna, 2012). Moreover, Four students from the
University of Missouri were severely injured during hydrogen explosion in June, 2010
(U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board, 2010). There are few examples
of recent tragic accidents that resulted in injuries, fatalities, and financial losses, not to
mention school reputation.
Such examples of fatal accidents, along with other non-fatal ones, indicate that
perhaps young college students lack the safety awareness that could prevent such
tragedies.
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These young engineers are part of future US workforce where employment
reached 19.5 million young worker (between the age of 16 and 24 years old) in July 2012
that is 2.1 million increased compared to April 2011 (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2012).
During the period of 1998-2007, The U.S. recorded 3.6 deaths per 100,000 young
workers. Further more, 7.9 million nonfatal injuries treated in emergency departments
(Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), 2010). In order to identify the lack
in safety training within students, a survey was conducted to measure safety training,
knowledge and attitude of these young engineers.

LITERATURE REVIEW
Researchers have indicated that young workers are more at risk than their older
colleges when it comes to work place injuries (Salminen, 2004; McCabe, 2008; Breslin et
al., 2008). Other study showed that emerging adults prefer activities with higher
sensation- seeking than adults (Zuckerman, 1979). Numerous research have discussed
the variables that account for such behavior in emerging adults. Immaturity in decisionmaking in young adults might be categories to cognitive and psychosocial factors
(Steinberg & Cauffman, 1996).

Theories have tackled the risk taking behavior in

emerging adults and adolescents and they all revolve around three essential forms. First,
biological based on hormonal effects, asynchronous pubertal timing, or generic
predispositions. Second, psychological or cognitive deficiencies in self-esteem, cognitive
immaturity, affective disequilibrium, or high sensation seeking. Third, environmental
causes that focus on social influence related to family and peer interactions, or
community and societal norms (DiClemente, Hansen, & Ponton, 1995). Based on that, it
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is essential to measure the safety knowledge and attitude of these young engineers and
identify any safety training deficiencies to prevent undesired outcomes.

METHODOLOGY
In order to measure safety training, knowledge and attitude of young engineers, a
survey was constructed based on the Goal Question Metric approach with reference to
OSHA Guidelines 54 Fed Register #3904-3916. The GQM method required a top down
methodology in constructing the survey. First, goals need to be specified and focused on.
Next, based on these goals, a set of questions is used to measure the information
needed to accomplish these goals. Finally, metrics are used to quantify the data answered
in the questions (Basili, Caldiera, & Rombach, 1994). A questionnaire with 24 items
together with four demographic questions was used to collect the data. The goal of the
survey as depicted in Table 1, was to determine the amount of training the student have
on OSHA procedures, his/her knowledge of general safety procedures they think they
have versus what they actually do, their safety attitude and consciousness. Five questions
were asked about the amount of training that the young engineers had on personal
protective

equipment

(PPE),

lockout/tagout,

material

safety

data sheets, machine guarding and evacuation in case of an emergency based on OSHA
guidelines 54 Fed Register #3904-3916. Six questions were asked to test their knowledge
on OSHA procedures. Five questions were asked to evaluate their attitude toward safety
in the labs or workshops. Finally one question to discuss their safety consciousness as a
self-assessment.
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Table 1 The Goal Question Metric Survey Model
Goals

Questions

Metrics

Have you been trained to use the personal
Evaluate the
amount of
safety training
of Missouri
S&T design
team members

protective equipment (PPE)?
Have you been trained on how to
prepare/understand lockout/tagout?

-

Have you been trained on using material safety

-

data sheet (MSDS)?
Have you been trained on machine guarding?

-

No, never
Yes, no formal
training
Yes, formal
training
Can’t
remember

Have you been trained on evacuation from your
workplace or lab(s) in case of an emergency?
In which of the following situations are you
required to wear safety glasses? (Please check
all that apply)

Evaluate the
student design
team
members’
safety
knowledge

Lockout/tagout is required when. (Please check
all that apply)
Locks should always stay on the equipment
during the shift change? True or false

-

Percentage of
correct
response

-

Likert scale Open ended
discussion

When working in a workshop/lab, when do you
use MSDS (please check all the apply)
Which statement(s) are true about machine
guarding?
Please check all that applies regarding
emergency evacuation.

Evaluate the

In situations where safety glasses are required,

student design

how often do you wear them?

team

Do you refer to the MSDS whenever a

members’

chemical or a hazardous material is spilled?

safety attitude

How often do you check if machine guards re
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installed on the machine you are about to use?
In case of an emergency, how often would you
follow the instructions written for the
emergency action plan?
If you feel that PPE is not necessary when
working in workshops and labs. Please discuss
why below.
Evaluate the

How safety conscious are you?

student design

-

Likert scale Open ended
discussion

team
members’
safety
consciousness

RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
A total of 93 questionnaires were returned including responses that have answered
some of the survey questions. 68% of the respondents were male, 31% were female, and
1% preferred not to answer.

The majority of the respondents’ were undergraduate

students ranging between 32% seniors, 25% juniors, 18% freshman, and 17% sophomore,
where the others were 3% Alumni and 3% graduate students with 95% of the total
students majoring in Engineering. 95% of the students were either involved in one or
more design teams in the present or have been involved in the past and only 5% were
never involved in any design team. 97% of the students responded positively with regard
to receiving any types of safety training during college education or job safety training
such as OSHA 10 hour training, first aid CPR and AED, high school shop training, etc.
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Goal one: Evaluate the amount of safety training of Missouri S&T design team
members
When analyzing the students feed back to the amount of safety training they have
received, it was found that less than 30% of the respondents had any type of formal
training. This shows that the majority of these young engineers have been working in the
labs or workshops without the proper training, which makes them vulnerable to make
unfortunate accidents.

Goal two: Evaluate the student design team members’ safety knowledge
The amount of knowledge these young engineers have is insignificant. Less than
50% of the students recognized the correct procedures of safety in the workshops and
labs, which is evidence that their students lack the basic safety procedure knowledge.

Goal three: Evaluate the student design team members’ safety attitude
About 30% of the respondents would often follow safety procedures while they
are in workshops or labs working on their projects. The majority of students would either
follow the procedures occasionally or only when forced to.

Goal four: Evaluate the student design team members’ safety consciousness
The respondents were requested to evaluate their self-consciousness toward
overall safety; one can predict the response reading the analysis above. 58% of the
respondents find themselves as safety conscious when self-asses themselves, 25% find
themselves very conscious, 14% are neutral, and 3% are very conscious.
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CONCLUSION
There are some remarkable findings that were attained from this survey. Most of
the findings show that young engineers have been receiving informal training. Informal
safety training are often ineffective and does not always assure positive safety attitude or
safety performance, it actually can lead to death, injury, pain and economic loss (Whiles,
1999). Training should be conducted through educational institutes rather than randomly
selected organization with informal training that is based on general knowledge (Fanning,
2012; Robotham, 2001; Cekada, 2011). In order to reap the fruits of safety culture, it is
essential to implement such culture for novice engineers in their college education. It is
noticed that serious chemical or laboratory incidents are often thought to be the result of a
weak or deficient safety culture; a principal root cause of the incident (Committee on
Chemical Safety, 2012). A strong safety culture is required to protect employees but is
especially important in protecting students and in developing students’ skills and
awareness of safety. Thus, students will acquire the skills to recognize hazards, to assess
the risk of exposures to those hazards, to minimize the risk of exposures to hazards, and
to be prepared to respond to laboratory emergencies (Committee on Chemical Safety,
2012).
The findings of this survey showed that the respondents’ knowledge of five
domains of the OSHA guidelines was inadequate specifically with regards to PPE,
LOTO, MSDS, Machine guarding, and Emergency action plan.

Consequently, it

reflected on their attitude toward the risk that might come from their areas of
occupational safety and health. For young engineers and scientist in the work force, the
technical promotion ladder places them within future management and decision-making
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positions. (Allen & Katz, 1986). Engineers with high-potentials rapidly rise within their
organizations to positions of great distinction and leadership and they are competent in
transforming their acquired educational knowledge and skills into successful
entrepreneurial ventures (Hissey, 2000). Those young engineers are the future managers
of the organizations. Thus, training them at younger age would shape their safety attitude
positively to be inherited within the organization once they rank higher. Managers and
supervisors play an essential role in creating a safety climate within the organization the
safety culture that the managers and supervisors create within the organization have a
great impact perceptions of safety climate, which in return will influence the employees’
safety performance (Thompson, Hilton, & Witt, 1998). Safety is a positive value – it
prevents injuries, saves lives, and improves productivity and outcomes. When safety is
actively practiced, and is regarded as a critical core value by organizational leaders, it
bestows a sense of confidence and caring in all working there (Committee on Chemical
Safety, 2012).
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SECTION

2. CONCLUSION

The different risk management models utilized in the case studies showed their
competency in identifying potential risks of the system’s lifecycle. FMEA, FTA, and
RED address risks at the component and sub-system level, the Swiss Cheese Model focus
on risks related to human system interaction. Moreover, LOPA contemplate the system
in its entirety and designs defense layers to protect the system from an adverse outcome.
Finally, STAMP is a holistic model that identifies the reason why those safety
constraints in place were not effective in the first place.
The phase of risk identification dictates the different risk management models
discussed in the paper. For example, FMEA, with its capability in identifying failure
modes, is suitable in the preliminary design phase to prevent such failures by taking the
necessary cautiousness based on occurrence/severity ratings. RED can identify potential
failures of a product, as early as the conceptual phase, throughout the historical database
imbedded in the software. This is advantageous as RED can minimize any decision
making preconceptions.

FTA considers all potential causes resulting in undesired

consequences. All these causes can be evaluated to assure the stability of the system
where engineering managers lead these evaluation sessions. However, and regardless of
their potential in risk identification, both FTA and FMEA are time and recourses
consuming and they lack the ability to target human errors as potential cause of failure.
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The Swiss Cheese Model is beneficial when human system interaction is involved
in identifying risks. The model constructs defensive layers in the system and focuses on
human errors and human factors when assessing risk. The model suggest that in order for
an accident to occur all the safeguards in the system have to be breached with a trajectory
that passes through all the holes, which includes unsafe acts and latent conditions. Thus,
Swiss Cheese Model will not be applicable if one of the defensive layers is missing.
Layer of Protection Analysis (LOPA) utilizes the known risk to construct
defensive layers to protect the designated system. LOPA is a scenario-based approach,
which allows the managers to address probable mitigation tools to reduce undesired
consequences, including both human and organizational factors, which makes it unique
among other models. Yet, LOPA is project specific, which requires past knowledge and
experience since it not generic to all systems.
System Theoretic Accident Model and Processes recognizes the violation against
the existence safety constraints at each level of the hierarchy of any system. The model
main concern is why these safety controls were not effectively enforced if they have
adequately been designed at the first place. However, in order to utilize this model,
system hierarchy of the accident and accident report must be available for investigators to
successfully apply the model.
There is no risk assessment model that is able to identify all potential risks.
Engineering managers need to address and weigh their options when deciding which
method is appropriate for the project. Industry type, product/lifecycle phase, scheduling,
available recourses, and risk level identifications are important factors to consider in
selecting the proper risk assessment model. FMEA, FTA, and RED can be utilized at the
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core component level. Swiss Cheese Model and/or LOPA can trigger human errors and
organizational shortcomings. However, LOPA and STAMP is a beneficial technique to
use if overall safety of the system is the aim of the evaluator.
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